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ABSTRACT 
Since the 34-day war in 2006 between Hezbollah and Israel, psychological 
warfare has re-emerged as a topic of interest.  Many experts have asked the question: how 
could a non-state actor defeat Israel—a regional superpower—in such a short amount of 
time?  Hezbollah also defeated Israel in 2000 when it forced the state to unilaterally 
withdraw from southern Lebanon after an 18-year occupation.  Although Hezbollah’s 
psychological warfare strategy contributed greatly to these two successes, there also are 
other factors that contributed to Israel’s failures.  First, Israel incorrectly assessed its 
enemy which resulted in the development of overly ambitious objectives for Lebanon in 
addition to the application of inappropriate strategies.  Israel underestimated the level of 
support Hezbollah enjoyed from the Lebanese population through years of political 
participation and providing security, economic, and social services.  Second, Israel’s 
aversion to casualties inhibited it from choosing more bold military strategies.  Third, 
Hezbollah waged effective guerrilla warfare against Israel’s conventional military efforts.  
By embedding itself within the civilian population, the group became a difficult target to 
attack through conventional warfare.  Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy played 
a crucial role in exploiting Israel’s military mistakes and its aversion to casualties.       
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Hezbollah is a professional militant organization and political party that came into 
existence between 1982 and 1983 partly as a result of Israel’s invasion of southern 
Lebanon in 1982, and through the assistance of Iran and Syria.1  Since its creation, the 
group has positioned itself as a resistance movement with a stated objective of freeing 
Lebanon from the manipulation of imperialist powers, in particular the United States, 
France, and their allies.2   Starting in 1992, it began to evolve into a reputable political 
party after deciding to enter the political mainstream by participating in Lebanon’s 
parliamentary elections in an effort to legitimize its resistance.3  By 2005, the group 
decided to participate officially in the government's cabinet by reaching out to other 
political groups during the parliamentary elections and appointing ministers that were 
close to the party and a minister from within its own ranks.4  Hezbollah’s current political 
objective consists of maintaining its weapons in order to protect Lebanon and the Middle 
East region from Israeli and US influence.5    
Aside from its evolution as a political party, Hezbollah has been credited for 
Israel’s ultimate military withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and again in 2006 
following the 34-day war despite having only a few hundred guerrilla fighters.6  The 
                                                 
1 Augustus Richard Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” Journal 
of Palestine Studies 30 (2000):  23-24; and International Crisis Group, “Hizbollah and the Lebanese 
Crisis.”  http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm (accessed August 21, 2008).   
2 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah:  A Short History (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 
2007), 39. 
3 Amal Saad Ghorayeb, “Lebanon:  The Paradox of Hezbollah’s Arms,” Arab Reform Bulletin 3, no. 5 
(September 2005), www.CarnegieEndowment.org (accessed August 21, 2008). 
4 Ibid., 1-2. 
5 International Crisis Group, “Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis.”   
6 For articles claiming that Hezbollah was responsible for Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon 
in 2000 and retreat during the 34-day war in 2006, see:  Ron Schleifer, “Psychological Operations:  A New 
Variation on an Age Old Art:  Hezbollah versus Israel,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006):  1-19; 
and Dr. Pierre Cyril Pahlavi, “The 33-Day War:  An Example of Psychological Warfare in the Information 
Age,” The Canadian Army Journal 10 (2007):  12-24. 
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group is recognized for having employed an effective military strategy since the 1990s 
which combined conventional and psychological warfare.7  Although this strategy is not 
new, Hezbollah was unique in that it subjected “virtually all of its military operations to 
its propaganda and mass media requirements.”8  To what extent did Hezbollah’s unique 
psychological warfare strategy prevent Israel from achieving its military and political 
objectives in Lebanon between the 1990s and 2006?  This thesis will investigate how 
Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy impacted Israel’s military and political 
objectives in Lebanon during this time period by reviewing secondary academic sources 
and related propaganda.    
B. IMPORTANCE 
Psychological warfare is different from conventional warfare in that it uses non-
violent methods to deliver messages to target audiences in order to further the war effort.  
Target audiences are broken down into three categories:  the domestic, neutral, and 
enemy audience. This type of warfare has three components:  the target audiences, the 
messages and themes, and the channels of communication.9  If employed effectively, 
psychological warfare can serve as a force multiplier for the weaker adversary in 
asymmetric conflicts. 
According to some experts, the two wars that took place in Lebanon from 1982 to 
2000 and the summer of 2006 are perfect examples of “modern asymmetric conflicts 
which . . . ended in unexpected victory by David over Goliath.”10  During both conflicts, 
Israel was forced to quit because the government was unable to convince its domestic 
audience that the fight was worth pursuing, despite its military superiority as the world’s 
fifth-largest military.11  This may be partly a result of Hezbollah’s psychological warfare 
                                                 
7 Schleifer, 5; and Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal,” 31. 
8 Schleifer, 5. 
9 Ibid., 3. 
10 Pahlavi, 12.  
11 For articles claiming that Israel quit because the government was unable to convince its domestic 
audience that the fight was worth pursuing, see:  Schleifer, 2; and Pahlavi, 12.  
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campaign which targeted various groups within Israel’s population and government.12  
By systematically examining the psychological warfare strategy lodged by Hezbollah 
against its enemy, one may be able to identify the extent to which a sub-state actor was 
able to cause a regional superpower to lose confidence in its military superiority. 
While Israel was experiencing a self-image crisis, Hezbollah was winning the 
“hearts and minds” of its domestic audience and gaining credibility among the regional 
and international community.13  Although the group has been placed on the US State 
Department’s list of terrorist organizations, the Europeans still refuse to formally classify 
Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.  This is impressive considering that the group 
espouses anti-Western ideology and rhetoric and gained notoriety during the 1980s for its 
suicide bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings.14  By looking at the strategic 
communications strategy employed by Hezbollah against their domestic and neutral 
target audience, one may be able to identify how a terrorist organization was able to 
overcome its own negative public image while sabotaging its enemy’s.  
Currently, the United States’ Global War on Terror being carried out in Iraq has 
striking similarities to Israel’s asymmetric conflict with Hezbollah.  The United States, as 
the Goliath, increasingly is experiencing an image crisis both at home and in the 
international community as a result of its military actions abroad.  Meanwhile, the 
insurgents have been able to manipulate the opinions of their supporters and the neutral 
target audiences by employing psychological warfare strategies of their own.15  Lessons 
learned from Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah can be used to develop an effective US 
public diplomacy strategy against terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
                                                 
12 Schleifer, 8. 
13 Schleifer, 2; Pahlavi, 7. 
14 Pahlavi, 7; and Kim Cragin, “Hizballah, the Party of God,” in “Aptitude for Destruction,” ed. Rand 
Corporation (Santa Monica:  Rand Corporation, 2005), 41-43. 
15 Colonel Thomas Hammes, USMC, The Sling and the Stone  (St. Paul:  Zenith Press, 2006), 208; 
and Maura Conway, “Terrorism and the Making of the “New Middle East’:  New Media Strategies of 
Hizbollah and al Qaeda.” 
http://64.233.179.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:arJz335_rfIJ:www.ir.dcu.ie/503/01/new_media_2007.p
df+%22maura+conway%22+AND+%22new+media+strategies%22 (accessed August 31, 2008).   
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Determining the extent to which Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy 
impacted Israel’s political and military objectives in Lebanon between the 1990s and 
2006 will be complicated because there are many other causal factors.  First, Israel’s 
military and political objectives in Lebanon between 1990 and 2006 will be identified.  
Second, Israel’s perceived failure in achieving these objectives will be assessed.  This 
will be difficult for the 34-day war because opinions vary whether Israel or Hezbollah 
won in 2006.   
Third, Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategies between 1990 and 2006 will 
be identified.  These strategies will be compared to Israel’s perceived failures in order to 
determine whether they correlate.  As stated earlier, it will be difficult to isolate the 
impact that Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy had on Israel’s military and 
political objectives from other causal factors.  However, it will be presumed that 
Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy was the primary factor for why Israel was 
unsuccessful in achieving its military and political objectives in Lebanon between 1990 
and 2006.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to Dov Waxman in his article, “Between Victory and Defeat:  Israel 
after the War with Hizballah,” both the 1982 and 2006 wars were voluntarily initiated by 
Israel.16  Consequently, these wars were more controversial because the country and its 
leadership became morally responsible for its outbreak and subsequent deaths on both 
sides.17  The 1982 Israeli invasion was launched in order to destroy the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) as a political and military force in Lebanon and install a 
pro-Israeli government in Beirut.  The first objective was partially achieved; however, the 
second was not, and Israel did not withdraw from Lebanon until 2000.18  Although the 
                                                 
16 Dov Waxman, “Between Victory and Defeat:  Israel after the War with Hizballah,” The Washington 
Quarterly 30 (2006-07):  28-29. 
17 Waxman., 28-29. 
18 Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal,” 23. 
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2006 war was in response to Hezbollah killing and capturing Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
soldiers across an internationally recognized border, Israel’s response was seen as 
disproportional.  Fed up with Hezbollah, the Israeli government decided to commence an 
all-out war in order to finally eliminate Hezbollah’s mini-state in southern Lebanon and 
replace it with Lebanese government sovereignty.  Instead, the war resulted in a cease fire 
with both sides claiming victory.  Also, the public perception within Israel and around the 
world was that Israel, for the first time in history, lost a conflict.19  
There is general consensus that Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy was a 
contributing factor for Israel’s military withdrawal in 2000 and 2006, as seen in Ron 
Schleifer’s article, “Psychological Operations:  A New Variation on an Age Old Art:  
Hezbollah versus Israel” and Dr. Pierre Cyril Pahlavi’s article, “An Example of 
Psychological Warfare in the Information Age.”20  However, there is no consensus on the 
extent to which psychological warfare contributed to Hezbollah’s military success.  
Schleifer states that “Hezbollah’s shrewd application, and refinement, of psychological 
warfare . . . ultimately proved a key factor in Israel’s decision to quit Lebanon in 2000.”21  
Pahlavi emphasizes that Hezbollah’s success during the 2006 conflict was a 
psychological triumph over Israel.  Also, the conflict was not merely a cross-border 
dispute, but an asymmetric war in the information age.22   This assertion would suggest 
that Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy was the deciding factor for Israel’s 
military withdrawal.  Marvin Kalb and Carol Saivetz, on the other hand, acknowledge 
that media coverage was a weapon during the 2006 conflict, but they only conclude that 
Israel was victimized more than Hezbollah by it.  They do not assess the extent to which 
psychological warfare contributed to Israel’s withdrawal.23 
                                                 
19 Waxman, 28-29. 
20 Schleifer 2; and Pahlavi, 21. 
21 Schleifer, 2. 
22 Pahlavi, 21. 
23 Marvin Kalb and Carol Saivetz, “The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006:  The Media as a Weapon of 
Asymmetrical conflict,” The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 12 (2007):  43. 
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There also is agreement that Hezbollah has been more adept at leveraging the 
media for their military and political purposes than Israel has.24  Schleifer claims that the 
“visual media proved one of Hezbollah’s most effective weapons.”25  Martha Conway, in 
a case study, assessed that the group was extremely successful in employing their 
television station, al-Manar, as “weapon in their information war.”26  Pahlavi explains 
that one of Hezbollah’s crucial assets was its ability to establish a privileged working 
relationship with international press correspondents.  Israel, on the other hand, was 
unable to do this.27   
Nonetheless, opinions vary as to why Hezbollah was more effective than Israel in 
waging psychological warfare.  Pahlavi believes that one of the reasons Israel was less 
successful was because it subordinated psychological warfare to its confidence in its 
military supremacy.  In contrast, Hezbollah made psychological warfare a priority 
because of its weaker military status.28  This is demonstrated by the fact that 
psychological warfare objectives eventually began to dictate the organization’s military 
operations.29  Kalb and Saivetz believe that Israel mostly was hurt by its open society 
because it was unable to control messages being disseminated from its own media.  
Hezbollah, on the other hand, was able to maintain total control of the daily messages 
delivered through journalism and propaganda to the rest of the world.30  The relative 
priority of psychological warfare to Israel and Hezbollah and the openness of their 
respective societies are both sound explanations for why Hezbollah won the information 
war.  However, it would be difficult to determine which factor was more important. 
                                                 
24 For articles claiming that Hezbollah was more adept than Israel at leveraging the media, see:  
Pahlavi, 19; Kalb and Saivetz, 44-45. 
25 Schleifer, 6.  
26 Conway, “Terrorism and the Making,” 7. 
27 Pahlavi, 19. 
28 Ibid., 16-17. 
29 Schleifer, 8. 
30 Kalb and Saivetz, 43-44. 
 7
Some authors, such as Waxman in “Between Victory and Defeat:  Israel after the 
War with Hizballah,” and Augustus Norton in “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal 
from Southern Lebanon,” argue that Israel failed during the 1982 and 2006 wars partly 
because they pursued a flawed strategy.31  For example, during the 1982 war, Israel 
believed that by punishing the Lebanese people in general, Beirut would be moved to 
stop the resistance.  However, this punishment actually increased support for the 
resistance, even among non-Shi’a Lebanese.  Furthermore, killing of innocent civilians 
intensified the perception that Israel was an evil entity.32  Similarly, during the 2006 war, 
Israel hoped that if Lebanon was made to suffer for Hezbollah’s actions, the government 
finally would rein-in the organization.  Again, this strategy produced the opposite results.  
The government also was accused of poor planning, intelligence blunders, overreliance 
on airpower, and providing insufficient ground troops and supplies.33 
Although most of the literature reviewed focused heavily on Hezbollah’s 
psychological warfare successes during both wars, very little was discussed regarding 
what, if anything, the organization did wrong.  Identifying weaknesses of Hezbollah’s 
psychological warfare capabilities and strategies would be useful in developing 
counterstrategies.  None of the literature reviewed discussed suggestions for developing a 
comprehensive strategy to combat Hezbollah’ psychological warfare techniques.  
Not surprisingly, the literature reviewed used conflicting terms to describe the 
conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah.  For example, Conway described it as 
“cybercortical warfare,” which she defines as public diplomacy in a conflict situation.34  
In another article, Conway describes the conflict as “information warfare.”35  Schleifer 
                                                 
31 Waxman, 29. 
32 Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal,” 27. 
33 Waxman, 31. 
34 Maura Conway, “Cybercortical Warfare:  The Case of Hezbollah.org,”  (paper presented at the 
European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, UK, March 28 – 
April 2, 2003) 4. 
35 Maura Conway, “Terror TV? An Exploration of Hizbollah’s Al-Manar Television.” 
http://doras.dcu.ie/499/1/terror_tv_2007.pdf. (accessed August 31, 2008) 1. 
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and Pahlavi view it as “psychological warfare.”36  Kalb and Saivetz described the conflict 
between Hezbollah and Israel as “asymmetric warfare,” emphasizing the use of media as 
a weapon.37  Although Colonel Hammes, USMC does not address the conflict 
specifically in his book The Sling and the Stone, his definition of “fourth-generation 
warfare” also could apply.38   
The prevailing notion is that the media will continue to be important in today’s 
asymmetrical warfare environment.39  For example, Kalb and Saivetz conducted content 
analysis of global media and interviews with many diplomats and journalists and 
concluded that the media is no longer an “objective observer.”  Instead, it now is a “fiery 
advocate, becoming in fact a weapon of modern warfare.”40  Colonel Hammes explained 
that the media increasingly will shape the policy of actors participating in fourth-
generation warfare.41  Even the head of Hezbollah’s media relations department was 
quoted as saying, “We believe that the media has an important role in the conflict, as 
important as the military wing.”42  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses a historical case study of Hezbollah’s psychological warfare 
strategy between 1990 and 2006 in response to Israel’s military activities in Lebanon.  
The historical study examines Israel’s military and political objectives in Lebanon during 
this time period and the degree to which it failed or succeeded.  It also examines 
Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy against Israel during this time period.  The 
group’s psychological warfare strategy is broken down by target audiences, messages and 
themes, and channels communication.  A comparative study is done to assess the impact 
                                                 
36 Schleifer, 2; and Pahlavi, 12. 
37 Kalb and Saivetz, 43. 
38 Hammes, 208.  
39 For articles or books discussing the increasing importance of the media in asymmetrical warfare, 
see:  Kalb and Saivetz, 43; Hammes, 210; and Conway, “Cybercortical.”    
40 Kalb and Saivetz, 43. 
41 Hammes, 210. 
42 Conway, “Cybercortical,” 12. 
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that these comprehensive psychological warfare strategies had on Israel’s military and 
political objectives.  This analysis should provide a basis for assessing the impact that 
Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategies had on Israel’s perceived military and 
political failures in Lebanon.  Information was obtained from online think-tank sources 
(e.g., The Crisis Group), secondary academic sources, and a survey of propaganda 
disseminated by the group during these two wars (i.e., television, online, journals, etc.).    
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis begins with a background on Hezbollah, including how it was created, 
its objectives and ideology, methods for achieving its objectives, organizational structure 
and significant relationships.  Next, Israel’s military and political objectives in Lebanon 
between 1990 and 2006 are outlined with an assessment defining the extent to which it 
failed or succeeded.  Following this, Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategies during 
this time period are examined by identifying the group’s target audiences, messages and 
themes, and channels of communication.  The thesis concludes with a comprehensive 
assessment determining the extent to which Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategies 
directly or indirectly contributed Israel’s perceived failure in Lebanon.  This section also 
discusses what, if anything else, Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategies achieved 
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II. BACKGROUND ON HEZBOLLAH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Hezbollah has been credited twice for Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from 
Lebanon—first in 2000 after an 18-year long occupation and then again in 2006 after the 
34-day war.43  The question many ask is to what extent did the group’s psychological 
warfare strategy prevent Israel from achieving its military and political objectives in 
Lebanon?  This thesis suggests that although Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy 
played a key role in these two wars, it was not the deciding factor.   
To set the background for the arguments made in this thesis, this Chapter explains 
how and why Hezbollah was created.  Second, it briefly defines the group’s objectives 
and ideology in order to understand why it has such strong animosity towards Israel.  
Third, in order to appreciate what this non-state actor accomplished in relation to the fifth 
largest military in the world, the organizational structure of Hezbollah is outlined.  
Fourth, the methods employed by the group—to include military, political participation, 
providing social services, and psychological warfare—to achieve its objectives are 
explained.  Fifth, the significant relationships Hezbollah has within and outside Lebanon 
are discussed to illustrate that the group is more than a Shi’a Islamist organization.     
B. CREATION OF HEZBOLLAH 
Hezbollah is a professional militant organization and political party that came into 
existence between 1982 and 1983 as a result of Shi’a marginalization, the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.44  The Shiites in Lebanon were 
prime targets for social mobilization because traditionally they were relatively 
powerless—socially, economically, and politically—compared to the Maronite Christians 
                                                 
43 For articles claiming that Hezbollah was responsible for Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon 
in 2000 and retreat during the 34-day war in 2006, see:  Schleifer, 1-19; and Pahlavi, 12-24. 
44 Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal,” 23-24; and International Crisis Group, “Hizbollah 
and the Lebanese Crisis.”  http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm (accessed August 21, 2008).   
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and Sunni Muslims.45  According to Norton, the “Shiites were the most deprived 
community in Lebanon.  They were the poorest, the least educated, and the least likely to 
benefit from government-provided services such as health facilities or public utilities.”46  
Furthermore, the Shiites primarily were located in southern Lebanon where the PLO and 
Israel battled each other during the 1970s.  Consequently, the Shiites carried the brunt of 
the PLO-Israeli conflict in southern Lebanon.47   
According to authors Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, in order 
for a group to mobilize, members need to have a legitimate grievance about some 
particular aspect of their lives, and have reason to believe that collective action will solve 
the problem.48  The 1979 Iranian revolution provided hope to the Shiites, who already 
were demoralized and now exhausted from the hostilities taking place in Lebanon.  The 
events in Iran provided an example of what a determined Shiite effort against oppression 
could accomplish.49  Hezbollah’s Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah later gave 
further explanation for why the group and its followers had such a strong sense of 
optimism:   
In the Quran, God promises the mujahidin victory if they do jihad and go 
to war, and they are doing exactly that.  Ever since we started the 
resistance in 1982, and up to today, we rely on the fact that God will grant 
us victory if we obey him.  Only God can grant the young men of the 
resistance peace of mind, and although we have no missiles or aircraft to 
shell Tel Aviv with, the Israelis live in constant fear of our operations.50 
 
                                                 
45 Augustus Richard Norton, “Changing Actors and Leadership among the Shiites of Lebanon,” 
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With a grievance and sense of hope for the Shi’a already in place, the catalyst for 
the establishment of Hezbollah was the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel.51  Initially, 
the Shi’a and Christian population in southern Lebanon, wanting to be rid of the PLO, 
welcomed Israel.  The expulsion of the PLO provided the Lebanese with an opportunity 
to reclaim control over the south.52  However, Israel soon forged an alliance with the 
Maronite Christians to the detriment of Shi’a welfare.53  The Shi’a once again 
marginalized and bearing the brunt of Israel’s occupation soon grew resentful towards the 
Jewish state.54  Even former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was quoted saying:  
“When we entered Lebanon . . . there was no Hezbollah . . . it was our presence there that 
created Hezbollah.”55  Another former prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, similarly 
commented that Israel had the “genie out of the bottle.”56    
Consequently, most of the elements necessary for social mobilization were 
present in Lebanon for the Shi’a: grievances, a belief that something could be done to 
change the situation, and a catalyst.  Motivated to spread its Islamic Revolution model, 
Iran provided the mobilizing structures necessary for Hezbollah to be created.57  
Mobilizing structures are defined as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as 
formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.”58  First, Iran 
deployed up to 15,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards to the Bekaa in order to recruit 
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members and assist with their religious indoctrination and military training.59  Iran also 
provided Hezbollah with considerable economic assistance and weapons to carry out 
military operations against Israel.60  Additionally, it helped the group develop a social 
service network, based on the Iranian model, which was instrumental in spreading their 
ideology and generating collective action.61  Starting in the 1990s, Iran also encouraged 
and helped Hezbollah to transition into politics.62   
In addition to support from Iran, the group received considerable assistance from 
Syria in the form of training, financing, weapons, and a transit route for Iranian weapons.  
Early on, Syria viewed support for Hezbollah as a means to maintain an alliance with 
Iran, directly and indirectly harass both Israel and the United States, and keep its 
Lebanese allies in line.63  According to author Kim Cragin, Hezbollah profited from the 
unique relationship it had with its sponsor states—Iran and Syria—which allowed it to 
grow exponentially quicker than militant groups lacking state sponsors.64     
C. OBJECTIVES AND IDEOLOGY 
Hezbollah did not formally announce its existence until February 1985 through a 
public manifesto detailing its objectives and ideology.  The three stated objectives of the 
group were to:  1) resist Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, 2) reject Lebanon’s political 
system which Hezbollah perceived as corrupt, and 3) support the creation of an Islamic 
state within the country.65  The ultimate goal of the group has been to destroy Israel and 
to liberate Palestine.  This would be pursued after accomplishing their first objective—
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driving Israeli forces from southern Lebanon.66  However, after Israel officially withdrew 
from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah’s new priority has been to maintain its armed status in 
order to protect Lebanon and the Middle East region from Israeli and US influence.67   
Hezbollah has many lenses through which it views the world.  First, according to 
Avi Jorisch, the group has categorized its enemies into three concentric circles—the first 
circle obviously consisting of Israel and the United States.  The group justifies violence 
against both Israeli civilians and military because they are recognized as occupiers.  
Furthermore, Israel’s mere existence is an act of terrorism which categorizes Hezbollah’s 
resistance as counterterrorism.  Similarly, the United States is perceived to be the primary 
supporter of Israel, therefore supporting state terrorism.  The second circle consists of any 
other country that illegally inhabits land and oppresses the indigenous population.  The 
final circle represents any government or international organization, such as the European 
Union, that is submissive to the United States and the West in general. 68   
Second, Hezbollah considers the community of believers to consist of Arab and 
non-Arab Muslims.  However, they are followers of Wilayat al-Faqih, which places Iran 
at the epicenter of the group’s “religious and pan-Islamic worldview.”69  They consider 
Ayatollah Khumayni to have been the “divinely inspired ruler” of the community of 
believers.70  Khumayni, after his death, was followed by Ali Khamene’i.71  Third, 
Hezbollah divides the world into two main groups:  the oppressed and the oppressors 
which also represent good and evil.  Jorisch claims that by dividing the world into these 
two categories, the group is able to justify working with both Muslim—Sunni and  
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Shi’a—and non-Muslims.  He also asserts that the ultimate qualifier for the group to 
work with another group is the latter’s attitude toward Israel, the United States, and the 
West in general.72   
D. METHODS 
This section describes the methods that Hezbollah has employed to achieve its 
objectives since its creation in 1982.  The group has evolved considerably over time, first 
gaining notoriety as a Shi’a terrorist organization and now recognized as a reputable 
Lebanese political party with a strong military wing and providing critical economic, 
educational, and social services that the Lebanese state is either unwilling or unable to 
provide.  In addition to these methods, the group has been able to win the support of the 
Lebanese population through a psychological warfare campaign that employs an 
extensive media apparatus.   
1. Military 
From about 1983 to 1988, Hezbollah pursued resistance through local and 
international terrorism as it conducted multiple suicide bombings, kidnappings, and 
hijackings primarily against Israeli, French and US targets.73  Around 1985, the group 
also began to conduct guerrilla warfare against IDF and South Lebanese Army (SLA) 
targets in southern Lebanon74  Hezbollah conducted these attacks in order to position 
themselves as the “protectors of the Lebanese (not just Shiite) population of southern 
Lebanon from the vicissitudes of Israeli occupation.”75  Consequently, the group was 
careful when conducting military operations to avoid causing unnecessary collateral 
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damage.76  According to Cragin, most analysts credit the training provided by Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guards for Hezbollah’s early tactical accomplishments.77 
Beginning around 1988, after Syria forced a truce between Hezbollah and its rival 
Amal, the group was able to focus more on improving its capabilities—particularly in the 
area of guerrilla and psychological warfare.  As a result, by the early 1990s, Hezbollah 
was successfully attacking Israeli military outposts in the security zone.  It also was able 
to infiltrate the SLA and expand throughout southern Lebanon.   In response, Israel 
started to exert more pressure on Hezbollah through counterterrorism operations.  Also 
during this time, the group became more concerned with operational security because it 
had to operate in areas with less support.78   
During the early 1990s, Hezbollah briefly reverted back to international terrorism 
when it bombed the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, conducted a suicide attack 
against a Jewish cultural center again in Buenos Aires in 1994, and then carried out a 
bombing against the Israeli embassy and charity headquarters in London in 1994.79  
These attacks were retaliation for the Israeli assassination of the group’s former leader, 
Abbas al-Musawi.  Some experts believe that Hezbollah resorted to this tactic again 
because it was unable to respond militarily against an IDF effort to target and remove 
leaders of the group.80  However, by 1996 the group was able to project the image that it 
was winning battles against the IDF on a daily basis, primarily through kidnappings, 
roadside bombs, and its own media.  As Israel responded to these attacks with air strikes, 
Hezbollah would respond by broadcasting the collateral damage and then firing rockets 
into northern Israel.81  This cycle of violence continued until 2000 when Israel finally 
decided to withdraw from southern Lebanon.     
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After Israel’s withdrawal, many outside the organization began to question 
whether Hezbollah needed to maintain its armed status.82  The group argued against this 
by claiming that its resistance surpassed liberation and included strategic defense.  They 
also rejected any notion of subsuming its arms under central command of the Lebanese 
army.83  Hezbollah also began efforts—with the help of Iran and Syria—to increase its 
military capabilities.  For example, the group immediately resumed control of southern 
Lebanon after the unilateral withdrawal of Israel and began to create its own military 
infrastructure throughout.84  They built up their tactical and strategic arsenal by acquiring 
an impressive inventory of anti-tank weapons and short, medium, and long range rockets 
and ballistic missiles from Iran and Syria.85  They also received several C-802 anti-ship 
missiles and 30 unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran that were capable of carrying 
explosives.86  During this time, Hezbollah also carried out mostly symbolic attacks 
against Israel, primarily in the disputed Shebaa Farms area.  These attacks consisted of 
cross-border raids and mortar attacks.87 
2. Political 
In an effort to generate greater legitimacy for Hezbollah’s resistance, the group 
decided, in 1992, to enter the political mainstream as a political party. 88  Interestingly, 
Hezbollah initially eschewed political participation after the signing of the Taif Accord in 
1989, which put an end to Lebanon’s civil war and created the state’s sectarian political 
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system.89  This change of heart was prompted by the urging of its sponsor and financier, 
Iran.  Following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, a more pragmatic leadership 
took form in Iran under President Hashemi Rafsanjani.90  In an effort to downplay the 
influence that Iran’s ideology had on its foreign policy and to improve relations with its 
Arab neighbors, Rafsanjani strongly encouraged Hezbollah to “become more a part of 
Lebanon and less an extension of Iran.”91   
Therefore, starting in the early 1990s, the group attempted to gain more support 
for their resistance by integrating into Lebanon’s parliamentary system while maintaining 
continued military pressure on the IDF in the southern security zone.92  Nasrallah also 
publicly justified Hezbollah’s entry into the political arena by stating, “it is important for 
the party to be represented in the Lebanese parliament in order to contribute to the 
elimination of political confessionalism, which is one of the party’s main goals.”93  
Nasrallah primarily was responsible for implementing the group’s political campaign and 
creating ties with other sectarian groups within Lebanon.94  Even in 1999, Iran’s new 
president Muhammad Khatami reminded Hezbollah to maintain good relations with the 
other sectarian groups in Lebanon.95 
Nonetheless, Hezbollah’s political design for Lebanon has been uncertain.  Some 
experts claim that the group desires Islamic law or the “rule of the shari’a.”  The group 
itself has publicly stated that once the country is free from internal and external 
domination, the Lebanese people will determine their fate.  They claim that if the people 
choose freely, they will choose Islam.96  However, since entering politics in 1992, the 
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group has never mentioned the creation of an Islamic state in its election programs.  Also,  
none of its members in parliament or in elected positions of local government have called 
for an Islamic state or attempted to pass laws or policies that would suggest a strategy 
towards this goal.97 
3. Social Service Network 
In addition to military and political methods, Hezbollah from the beginning 
created an extensive social service network in order to win the support of the population 
in the security zone and surrounding areas.98  This method likely was pursued not only as 
a mobilizing tactic for resistance, but also as a grass-roots approach to achieving the 
group’s third, long-term objective—the creation of an Islamic state within the country.99  
At first, this network was created in order to lessen the hardships of impoverished Shi’a 
but eventually was expanded to also support Sunnis and Christians.  Hezbollah’s 
Construction Campaign, Jihad al-Bina, provided social services and public utilities that 
the Lebanese government was either unwilling or unable to provide for its citizens.100  
Some of these services included operating hospitals, orphanages, schools, gas stations, 
and providing scholarships, road paving service, and sewage systems.101   
Through this social network system, Hezbollah was able to achieve its “state 
within a state” status.  Some notable examples of the group’s services include 
compensating 2,300 farmers and  rebuilding over 5,000 Shi’a homes after Israel’s 1996 
“Operation Grapes of Wrath” campaign, treating roughly 60,000 women and 10,000 
children in Hezbollah-run hospitals each year, creating a network of Shi’a elementary and 
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middle schools, and providing basic provisions for citizens after a harsh storm in 1992.102  
It also operates a broad range of sporting and cultural clubs that help to recruit potential 
members.103  Hezbollah also helps to settle disputes by operating civil courts at mosques 
and religious centers.104  In short, the group was able to fill a void left by the Lebanese 
government by providing services to those in need of economic, educational, social, and 
sometimes religious services.  Consequently, many Lebanese citizens became dependent 
upon Hezbollah, making it extremely difficult for them to turn against the group—even 
when threatened by outside force.105        
4. Psychological Warfare 
Hezbollah was able to mobilize Lebanese citizens to support their resistance to 
Israel’s involvement in Lebanon through military, political, and social methods.  
However, above and beyond these methods, the group also employed psychological 
warfare to rally support for their resistance and also wear down the enemy’s will to 
continue in Lebanon.  As stated in the previous Chapter, psychological warfare “consists 
of delivering messages by nonviolent methods, to target audiences—domestic, neutral, 
and the enemy—with the aim of furthering the war effort.”106  Hezbollah’s strategy 
involved the use of a “sophisticated media capability to amplify the psychological impact 
of its guerrilla tactics and acted, in effect, as a counterweight to the IDF’s conventional 
military strength.”107   
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Hezbollah’s sophisticated media apparatus consists of newspapers, magazines, 
radio stations, television stations, and the internet.108  The group started off only using 
newspapers and magazines to convey its messages throughout the 1980s.  The weekly 
newspaper Al-Ahed was first disseminated in 1984 followed by the weeklies Al bilad, Al 
Wahda, El Islamilya; and the monthly Al Sabil.  The first radio station, al-Nour was 
founded in 1988, followed by two other stations.  Then, in 1991 the group launched the 
heart of its media apparatus, the television station al-Manar.109  These radio and 
television stations originally broadcasted only Arabic language programs targeting the 
local Arab population.110   
Over time, the group began to broadcast programs in Hebrew in order to target 
Israeli soldiers serving in Lebanon.  Hezbollah overcame skepticism and captured the 
attention of the enemy by filling its programs with information that would be deemed 
useful to intelligence analysts or the Israeli media.  Eventually, all of Israel’s television 
stations began to broadcast Hezbollah’s videotapes because they were the only published 
visual record of the war.  This material also began to be published in the foreign press.111  
The manager of al-Manar admitted that the station’s goal was to infiltrate the mind of 
every Israeli and affect their perception of what was happening in Lebanon.  This would 
require a thorough understanding of Israeli society.  Therefore, al-Manar created a 
department made up of Hebrew speakers whose job it was to monitor Israeli radio and 
television continuously throughout the day.112 
Although starting to broadcast in 1991, al-Manar was not officially sanctioned by 
the Lebanese television community until 1996.  Initially, the Lebanese government felt 
directly threatened by the revolutionary agenda broadcasted by the television station.  
After “Operation Grapes of Wrath” in 1996, the station began to gain greater acceptance 
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by the government and the Lebanese population.113  In 2000, the station started to 
transmit via satellite.  In 2001, Hezbollah leadership placed the station under the direct 
control of its senior committee which is chaired by Nasrallah.114  This chain-of-command 
demonstrates once again how important the group views media.115  According to author 
Victoria Firmo-Fontan, the station at one time described itself on its website as the “first 
Arab establishment to stage an effective psychological warfare against the Zionist 
enemy.”116  Even after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, the television station 
tailored its messages to generate an attitude conducive to collective action against Israel 
through resistance, according to Conway.117  
According to Schleifer, Hezbollah’s military strategy was unique because of the 
way it combined conventional and psychological warfare.  Specifically, the group 
subjected almost all of its military operations to its media requirements.118  Al-Manar 
was a central part of this strategy.119  Every Hezbollah unit deployed with a cameraman 
who recorded their operations.  After making appropriate edits—such as deleting scenes 
or adding music and narration—the clips would then be broadcasted on al-Manar.  The 
footage was selective in that it only showed scenes that favored Hezbollah, even if the 
fighters eventually were defeated by the IDF in that particular operation.120  
Consequently, al-Manar helped give the perception that Hezbollah was doing better on 
the battlefield than it actually was.    
Starting in 1996, Hezbollah began using the internet to spread their resistance 
message.  As of 2003, they had four official websites available in Arabic and English:  
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Hizbollah.org, which is the group’s official homepage; moqaawama.org (Islamic 
Resistance Support Association), which posted significant events on Israeli targets; 
manartv.com, which is al-Manar’s website; and nasrollah.net, which is the official 
homepage of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.121  According to Gabriel Weimann, Hezbollah 
also operates at least 50 other websites that can be organized into seven categories:  news 
and information, welfare and social services, religious indoctrination, personal websites 
for leadership, anti-Israel websites, and bulletin boards.122  Experts point out that most 
terrorist organizations avoid posting their violent activities on websites if they maintain 
an online presence.  However, Hezbollah and Hamas are the exceptions to this rule.  
Hezbollah in particular had a “Daily Operations” section that provided statistical data on 
its military successes—updated every minute.  Another section listed the number of dead 
martyrs along with the number of Israeli soldiers and collaborators killed. 123  
Hezbollah also has a media relations department which is overseen by Hassan 
Ezzieddine, a member of the Political Council.  This department reportedly is responsible 
for reviewing media coverage of Hezbollah, whether its newspapers, television or radio 
broadcasts.  They also are responsible for all of the group’s websites.124  The importance 
of this department is illustrated by a statement made by Ezzieddine in 2001: 
We feel that the media can be effective in creating a special climate in 
public opinion on the main issues of interest . . . We are heading toward a 
new sensitive security situation (in the region) which means we need to 
follow events very closely so that we can informatively help shape 
international and Arab public opinion . . . We believe that the media has 
an important role in the conflict, as important as the military wing.125 
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E. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Hezbollah currently is headed by Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 
replacing the group’s original leader, Abbas al-Musawi, who was assassinated by Israeli 
security forces in 1992.  Second in command is Deputy Secretary General Sheik Naim 
Qassem.  Beneath both leaders, the group is governed by a Shura Council consisting of 
17 members.  The group has a separate political and military wing; the latter oftentimes is 
referred to as the Islamic Resistance.  The political wing is controlled by a Politburo 
consisting of 15 members while the military wing is controlled by regional 
commanders.126    
Overall, the group has approximately 20,000 to 25,000 supporters.127  Estimates 
on the number of fighters belonging to the militant wing are either ambiguous or 
conflicting.  For example, author Anthony Cordesman estimates that there were 
approximately 2,000 to 3,000 fighters before the 2006 war, with Israel claiming to have 
killed more than 500 fighters.  He also claims that there are between a several thousand to 
more than 10,000 reservists.128  Meanwhile, Cragin estimates that the group has 
approximately 500 to 4,000 fighters.129  These inconsistent ranges illustrate how little is 
actually known about the group’s strength which likely is a result of good operational 
security by Hezbollah.   
F. SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPS 
This section explores the significant relationships Hezbollah has within Lebanon 
and throughout the Middle East region.  Although it primarily is an Islamic Shi’a group, 
Hezbollah has not discriminated against sects or religions within Lebanon when it comes 
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to providing social services or cultivating relationships.130  External to Lebanon, 
Hezbollah also has developed and maintained relationships with states and non-state 
actors outside their sect such as Syria and Hamas.  The group has proven to be quite 
pragmatic when it comes to whom they will cooperate with in order to maintain their 
weapons and further their resistance against Israel and the United States.  This 
demonstrates that although Hezbollah uses religion to mobilize its rank and file, the 
leaders are willing to modify the group’s ideology for the sake of achieving its objectives.  
In a sense, it demonstrates that the leaders are rational actors as opposed to religious 
zealots.     
1. Internal 
Lebanon’s political system is based on sectarian communities or confessions.  
Since the country’s independence in 1943, each of the 17 recognized sects were given 
political privileges, to include senior positions in the bureaucracy, membership in 
parliament, and positions in the high political office proportionate to the community’s 
size.  The highest political positions were awarded to the Maronites, Sunnis, and Shi’a.  
The Maronites, who were considered the plurality, were given the presidency.  The 
Sunnis, considered the second largest community, were given the premiership which is 
considered to be the second highest political position in the country.  The Shi’a, 
considered the third largest community, were given the speakership of the parliament, 
which holds weaker constitutional powers than the presidency or premiership.131  
Within Lebanon, there are currently two primary political coalitions:  the anti-
Syrian March 14 group which controls the parliament and consists mostly of the Sunnis 
and some Maronites; and the pro-Syrian March 8 group which is led by Hezbollah and 
Maronite leader Michel Aoun.  Historically, Hezbollah has gone through great lengths to 
appear non-sectarian, but a series of events over the last four years has caused a power 
struggle within Lebanon over sectarian lines and threatens to further erode support for 
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Hezbollah’s arms.132  These events include the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and subsequent withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, 
the 34-day war with Israel in 2006 and internal political competition that erupted in 
sectarian clashes in 2007 and 2008.133   
2. External 
Hezbollah’s relationship with the United States and its allies has been strained.  In 
2001, the United States labeled the group a foreign terrorist organization possessing 
global reach.  This label authorizes the imposition of sanctions on any third party that 
fails to freeze Hezbollah assets or extradite its operatives.134  The primary charge against 
the group rests on allegations that it has consistently been involved in a series of terrorist 
or terrorist-related activities since its creation.135  Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt 
criticized Hezbollah during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.136  In May 2008, a United 
Nations envoy warned that Hezbollah “maintains a massive paramilitary infrastructure 
separate from the state . . . that constitutes a threat to regional peace and security.”137 
In the early years, Iran was said to have a say in all of Hezbollah’s major 
decisions.  However, after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, the group gained some 
independence from Tehran.138  Today, Hezbollah’s autonomy from Iran is relative; the 
Islamic state no longer is as intrusive and meddling as it once was.139  This probably is 
the case because Iran’s power and influence throughout the region has grown; therefore, 
they likely are less dependent on Hezbollah to serve as a sole proxy in the Arab world.  
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However, the group still relies heavily on Iranian military and financial assistance, 
training and overall support.  Also, the group’s leadership still feels deeply loyal to the 
Iranian Revolution.140     
Syria also has provided considerable support to Hezbollah in the form of money 
and weapons. 141  As mentioned earlier, Syria initially viewed support for Hezbollah as a 
way to maintain a partnership with Iran, indirectly attack both Israel and the United 
States, and keep its Lebanese allies in line.142  However, Syria’s 2005 military 
withdrawal from Lebanon and the subsequent end of its direct political control over the 
country changed its relationship with the group.143  According to a former Hezbollah 
advisor, “ever since Syria withdrew from Lebanon, it intervenes with Hezbollah only 
when its vital interests are at stake.”144  The group still depends on Syria as the only 
transit route for Iranian weapons.145   
Hezbollah’s ultimate goal of destroying Israel and liberating Palestine explains its 
operational affiliation with rejectionist Palestinian groups that oppose the peace process 
that mainstream PLO officials and Israel have pursued for the last sixteen years.146  
Specifically, it is suspected of “providing advice, arms, and logistical – financial support 
to Palestinian groups, including Hamas, the Al-Aqsa Brigades and Islamic Jihad.”147  
After the start of the Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, Hezbollah deliberately 
began to broadcast continuous anti-Israeli propaganda into Palestinian homes through 
their television station al-Manar.  Since then, al-Manar has become one of the most 
widely watched television stations in Palestinian homes.148   
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Hezbollah also has been accused of working with al-Qaeda.  This working 
relationship allegedly includes al-Qaeda members visiting Hezbollah training camps and 
Hezbollah providing shelter to al-Qaeda fugitives.  Ties between the two groups are said 
to range from low-level operatives up to Osama Bin Laden and deceased senior 
Hezbollah official Imad Mughniyeh.149  However, there are conflicting reports saying 
that Hezbollah does not get along with al-Qaeda.  As mentioned above, Hezbollah 
decides whether it will cooperate with another group based on its attitude toward Israel, 
the United States, and the West.150  However, in 1997 Hezbollah condemned Ayman al-
Zawahiri for the al-Qaeda’s massacre of civilians in Luxor, Egypt.151  Also, al-Qaeda 
considers the Shi’a to be unbelievers who must be killed.  This ideological conflict makes 
it unlikely that the two groups would cooperate.   
Throughout the 1990s, Hezbollah made a conscious effort to establish and 
maintain good relations with the foreign press.  This was done in an attempt to erase the 
negative images held by many about the group because of their involvement in terrorism 
during the 1980s—especially kidnappings of foreign journalists.  Hezbollah also needed 
to counteract messages that the Israeli government was disseminating about the group.  
Press conferences were held as part of a public relations strategy.  For example, in 1999 
the group invited approximately 70 journalists to the security zone and served them 
beverages and pastries.  They also educated the group on their weapons systems, 
provided an interview with a martyr’s widow, and issued a press release about an 
operation against the IDF that killed one Israeli soldier—only 35 minutes after the 
operation occurred.152  These efforts likely contributed to improving the image of 
Hezbollah throughout Lebanon, regionally and internationally.   
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G. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter provides a background on Hezbollah in order to give context before 
discussing Israel’s involvement in Lebanon in Chapter III and Hezbollah’s psychological 
warfare strategy against Israel in Chapter IV.  The goal of this thesis is to prove that 
Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy was not the deciding factor that prevented 
Israel from achieving its objectives in Lebanon.  This Chapter first explains why and how 
the group was created; both Iran and Syria played a key role in mobilizing the 
traditionally marginalized Shi’a against Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon.   
Second, this Chapter defines the group’s objectives and ideology which 
establishes Israel and the United States as the ultimate enemy.  Interestingly, the group is 
willing to work with other state and non-state actors who also are against Israel and the 
United States, regardless of their religion or sect.153   Third, the means through which 
Hezbollah pursues its objectives is explained which include military, political, social, and 
psychological warfare methods.  Fourth, a brief description of the group’s organizational 
structure is provided in order to demonstrate its minuteness compared to Israel, the fifth 
largest military in the world.  Fifth, the significant relationships Hezbollah has within and 
outside Lebanon is explained.         
In sum, although limited in size and conventional military might compared to 
Israel, Hezbollah’s critical strength appears to be its internal legitimacy and the support it 
receives throughout the region by other anti-West actors such as Syria, Iran, and Hamas.  
Internal legitimacy has been gained through years of political participation, and by 
addressing the security, economic, and social needs of the Lebanese population.154  
Consequently, many Lebanese are dependent on Hezbollah and any attempt to detract 
support away from the group would need to take this relationship in mind.  Outside 
Lebanon, relationships have been developed or maintained on the basis of a common 
enemy, Israel and the United States.      
 
                                                 
153 Jorisch, 15. 
154 Norton, “Changing,” 110-111; and Schleifer, 6-7. 
 31
III. ISRAELI ACTIONS IN LEBANON 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to determine the extent to which Hezbollah’s psychological warfare 
strategy prevented Israel from achieving its military and political objectives in Lebanon 
from 1990 to 2006, this Chapter examines Israel’s involvement within Lebanon during 
this time period.  First, it defines Israel’s military and political objectives and the 
strategies employed to achieve them during three time periods:  1) the period starting in 
1990 after Hezbollah started to use psychological warfare until Israel’s unilateral 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, 2) the period since the 2000 withdrawal from 
Lebanon to the 34-day war in 2006, and 3) the period during the 34-day war.   Second, it 
examines whether Israel achieved its military and political objectives within Lebanon 
during these time periods.  Israel’s objective generally was to deter Hezbollah through a 
deterrence-by-punishment strategy during the occupation and 34-day war, with minimal 
force and diplomacy used in between the two conflicts.  However, the Jewish state was 
never able to achieve this objective.           
B. 1990 TO 2000 WITHDRAWAL 
In March 1978, the Israeli government launched the “Litani Operation” in 
response to repeated terrorist attacks by Palestinians based out of Lebanon.  This 
operation consisted of 8,000 Israeli soldiers driving PLO forces north of the Litani River 
in order to move PLO Katyusha rockets out of striking range of northern Israel.155  This 
campaign was significant because it was the first time since 1948 that Israel conducted a 
major cross-border invasion using conventional forces.156  Three months later, the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) stationed itself in a buffer zone while Israeli 
forces withdrew.  However, three years later PLO forces returned to southern Lebanon 
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along with increased Syrian influence throughout the country.157  These series of events, 
in addition to an assassination attempt against Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom 
Shlomo Argov, set the stage for Israel’s June 1982 “Operation Peace for Galilee” which 
resulted in Israel’s 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon.158   
 This section discusses Israel’s objectives during its occupation of Lebanon in the 
1990s after Hezbollah started to employ psychological warfare, up until Israel’s unilateral 
withdrawal in May 2000.  It also examines Israel’s strategy for achieving these 
objectives.  Third, this section addresses how Israel failed to achieve its objective which 
was to prevent Hezbollah from attacking within the security zone in Lebanon and into 
northern Israel.  It also was unable to turn the Lebanese population against the group 
which instead emerged from the occupation with more prestige. 
1. Objectives and Strategy 
The main reason for Israel’s occupation of the southern security zone was to 
protect the settlements and towns of northern Israel from guerrilla infiltration or attack.159  
Israel also wanted to deter Hezbollah from attacking Israeli and ally targets in the security 
zone160.  Both objectives would be achieved by leaving behind only a small number of 
IDF soldiers, while equipping and supporting the SLA to serve as a buffer in the zone 
between northern Israel and anti-Israeli forces in south Lebanon.161  Israel attempted to 
achieve deterrence through high-intensity attacks—consisting of artillery attacks and 
airstrikes—along with special operation missions in response to Hezbollah’s low-
intensity warfare.162   
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In response to sustained rocket attacks into northern Israel by Hezbollah, Israel 
twice resorted to an indirect-deterrence-by-punishment strategy:  “Operation 
Accountability” in 1993 and “Operation Grapes of Wrath” in 1996.163  The military 
objectives of these two campaigns were to destroy Hezbollah’s ability to conduct military 
attacks within southern Lebanon and into northern Israel.  This would be accomplished 
by eliminating their camps, supply lines, arms depots, and fighters.164  The Israeli 
government also hoped to cause resentment among the Lebanese civilian population 
against Hezbollah for inciting Israel’s military response and for them to ultimately 
“pressure Beirut to pressure Damascus to pressure Hezbollah to stop its activities.”165     
“Operation Accountability” was launched in response to the deaths of nine IDF 
soldiers operating within a defined combat zone in July 1993.  The Israeli government 
and public were frustrated because of the ineffectiveness of Israeli countermeasures 
against Hezbollah.  Since the Israeli public and government already were sensitive to IDF 
losses, the decision was made to rely on mass bombardment rather than infantry in a 
ground operation.  Artillery and airstrikes were used against not only Hezbollah, but also 
targets that would create a mass exodus of refugees from Shi’a villages towards Beirut 
that hopefully would pressure the Lebanese government to rein in Hezbollah.166   
“Operation Grapes of Wrath” was more extensive in that it targeted not only 
Hezbollah, but also non-Shi’a civilian targets throughout the port cities of Tyre and Sidon 
up to Beirut.  Even power stations on the outskirts of Beirut were targeted to send a stern 
message to the Lebanese government.  Warnings were given to civilians through radio 
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escape the air attacks.  Israel hoped that this mass exodus of non-Shi’a in addition to 
damage inflicted by airstrikes would pressure the government to curtail Hezbollah’s 
activities in the south.167   
2. Results 
Israel was unable to achieve any of its established objectives throughout its 
occupation of southern Lebanon, and instead incurred a cost of more than $1 million per 
day and 25 soldiers each year.168   Hezbollah was not deterred since the group was able 
to continue carrying out attacks against the settlements and towns of northern Israel.  
Instead, a cycle of violence developed where Israel’s military action in southern Lebanon 
was met by guerrilla style tactics from Hezbollah, instigating further retaliation from the 
IDF.  Invariably the IDF response would cause significant collateral damage for two 
reasons:  1) it was difficult to distinguish Hezbollah from the rest of the population, and 
2) the IDF wanted to send a message to the general population that it was dangerous to 
provide a safe haven to terrorists.  Hezbollah would use the collateral damage to their 
advantage by broadcasting it to the world and then further respond by launching 
Katyusha rockets into northern Israel.  This dual strategy—negative press and inciting 
fear among northern Israelis—usually caused Israel to cease their military incursion.169     
Israel’s failure to achieve deterrence is further demonstrated by the fact that it was 
provoked into launching “Operation Accountability” and “Operation Grapes of Wrath” in 
response to Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel in 1993 and 1996 respectively.  
The primary objective of these two campaigns was an extension of the reason Israel 
maintained a southern security zone in Lebanon—to protect northern Israel from guerrilla 
attacks.  However, once again Israel failed in achieving this aim because immediately 
following each operation, Hezbollah launched Katyusha rockets into Israel.170  The 
magnitude of Israel’s failure also can be demonstrated by the fact that after 2,000 air 
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strikes and 25,000 artillery shells, “Operation Grapes of Wrath” did not succeed in 
destroying any Katyusha rocket launchers while killing only 24 Hezbollah fighters.171   
The cease-fires ending both operations explicitly stated that neither Hezbollah nor 
Israel would deliberately attack the other’s civilians.  However, the agreements did not 
rule out continued warfare within southern Lebanon—the other primary objective of the 
two campaigns.  Immediately following each cease-fire agreement, Hezbollah resumed 
its guerrilla attacks against the IDF.172  Israel also was unable to turn the Lebanese 
civilian population against Hezbollah during both campaigns.  Instead, the Lebanese—
regardless of their religion or sect—felt compassion for the refugees and blamed Israel 
for the devastation rather than blame Hezbollah.  Even worse, Hezbollah emerged from 
both battles with more prestige, not only in Lebanon but throughout the Middle East.173  
For example, at a news conference during “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri likened Hezbollah to the French Resistance in World War II.174  
Also, both Christians and Muslims protested daily in favor of Hezbollah in addition to 
providing donations for the Islamic Resistance.175  In short, both “Operation 
Accountability” and “Operation Grapes of Wrath” can be counted as strategic failures for 
Israel and successes for Hezbollah.    
In 1999, General Ehud Barak was elected as the prime minister of Israel under a 
campaign promise that he would withdraw from Lebanon within one year of assuming 
office.176  After 18 years of military occupation in southern Lebanon, many in the Israeli 
government and its population had grown weary of the war and believed that the cause 
was no longer worth the cost.177  Barak fulfilled his campaign promise and in May 2000, 
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Israel unilaterally withdrew from southern Lebanon.178  Within Lebanon and throughout 
the Middle East, Israel’s withdrawal was interpreted as a victory for Hezbollah.  It also 
was seen as an indicator that Israel increasingly was unable to defeat Arab aggression 
because of its public’s intolerance for casualties.  Some experts believe that the 
Palestinian Second Intifada, which broke out soon afterwards in September 2000, partly 
was a result of this perception.179   
C. POST-2000 WITHDRAWAL UNTIL 34-DAY WAR 
This section examines how Israel’s policy towards Hezbollah following the 2000 
unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon ultimately failed to prevent the group from 
continuing on its trajectory of becoming a strategic threat.  First, it outlines Israel’s 
military and political objectives towards Hezbollah from 2000 until 2006, which was to 
deter and contain the group.180  Next, it discusses Israel’s strategy for achieving these 
objectives which was to use minimal force and diplomacy.181  Minimal force actually 
emboldened Hezbollah, while diplomacy failed because Lebanon, Syria, and Iran were 
either unwilling or unable to contain Hezbollah.182   
1. Objectives and Strategy 
After the 2000 withdrawal, the main objective of the Israeli government was to 
prevent rocket attacks against northern Israel and contain Hezbollah, but without having 
to go back into Lebanon.183  This constraint largely was a result of competing priorities 
that existed within Israel at the time.  In particular, Israel was more preoccupied with the 
Palestinian uprising that was taking place in the West Bank and Gaza.  The Intifada was 
absorbing much of Israel’s attention; therefore, the government could not afford a second 
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front against Hezbollah.  Also, Israel did not want to risk an escalation of violence with 
Hezbollah that would instigate conflict with Syria or disrupt the economic development 
that was taking place in northern Israel following the withdrawal from southern 
Lebanon.184   
For three months after Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, there was 
peace along the Lebanon-Israel border.  However, after the start of the Second Intifada in 
September 2000, Hezbollah resumed cross-border raids and mortar attacks against Israel, 
primarily in the disputed Shebaa Farms area.  Nasrallah cited the “bleeding wounds” as 
justification for Hezbollah’s continued resistance against its enemy.185  During this time 
period, the group’s attacks were more symbolic, claiming a little more than ten casualties 
over the next five years.186  In response, Israel demonstrated restraint and reacted 
proportionally to Hezbollah’s attacks which resulted in a strategy of mutual deterrence 
through a “balance of terror.”187  In order to contain Hezbollah, Israel emphasized 
diplomacy with Lebanon, Iran, and Syria.188  Israel viewed Hezbollah’s dependence on 
Syria and Iran for money and weapons as a critical vulnerability.189   
2. Results 
It can be asserted that Israel’s direct deterrence strategy failed since Hezbollah 
was not discouraged from carrying out attacks against northern Israel.  The tense period 
of peace that existed between Israel and Hezbollah collapsed in July 2006 when 
Hezbollah conducted an attack inside Israel, killing three soldiers and capturing two.  As 
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a diversionary tactic, the group also conducted mortar and rocket attacks against IDF 
outposts and civilian communities along the border.  These attacks were more brazen 
than usual because they occurred outside the Shebaa Farms area and against Israeli 
civilians, thereby breaking the informal rules that were established and followed by both 
Israel and Hezbollah during the preceding six years.190  In response, Israel retaliated by 
launching the 34-day war—officially ending the deterrence-through-minimal-force 
strategy.   
Israel also failed to contain Hezbollah through diplomacy with Lebanon, Iran, and 
Syria as the opposite actually occurred—Hezbollah grew in numbers, capabilities, and 
reputation.191  For example, Hezbollah immediately resumed control of southern 
Lebanon after the unilateral withdrawal of Israel and began to create its own military 
infrastructure throughout.192  The group built up their tactical and strategic arsenal by 
acquiring an impressive inventory of anti-tank weapons; and short, medium, and long 
range rockets and ballistic missiles from Iran and Syria.193  They also received several C-
802 anti-ship missiles and 30 unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran that were capable of 
carrying explosives.194  Hezbollah also was permitted by the Lebanese government to 
continue to develop as a political party, in addition to providing support to Lebanese 
citizens through their social service network.  Meanwhile, Hezbollah also actively 
supported Palestinian militants by providing financing, training, and equipment.195  
Aware of these activities, many Israeli officials soon began to realize that Hezbollah 
constituted more than a nuisance, but a strategic threat. 196   
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D. 34-DAY WAR 
This section examines how the 34-day war in 2006 proved to be a strategic failure 
for Israel and a strategic success for Hezbollah.  First, Israel’s military and political 
objectives for this war are briefly outlined, which were to reestablish deterrence, 
eliminate the threat posed by Hezbollah, and obtain the release of the captured soldiers.  
Second, this section discusses how Israel failed to achieve these objectives through a 
deterrence-by-punishment and a psychological warfare strategy.  Instead, Israel further 
degraded its deterrence in the region and gave Hezbollah the psychological upper hand 
not only in Lebanon, but also throughout the Middle East region and rest of the world.197          
1. Objectives and Strategy 
Although opinions vary regarding what Israel’s goals were for the 34-day war, it 
appears that it had two political objectives:  1) reestablish their deterrence throughout the 
region by sending a stern message to Hezbollah that it would not tolerate cross-border 
attacks on its soldiers and citizens, and 2) create a new order within Lebanon where the 
government exercised sovereignty over its territory and eliminated Hezbollah’s status as 
a “state within a state.”198  As with “Operation Accountability” and “Operation Grapes of 
Wrath,” Israel hoped to increase Lebanon’s political will to rein in Hezbollah by making 
the population suffer for the group’s activities.199   
Israel’s military objectives were to:  1) degrade or eliminate Hezbollah’s strategic 
missile and rocket threat, 2) create a security zone along the Israeli border free of 
Hezbollah military positions; and 3) obtain the release of the two captured Israeli soldiers 
through military operations.  Essentially with the first two military objectives, Israel 
hoped to hasten the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
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(UNSCR) 1559, which was passed in 2004 and called for the disarmament of Hezbollah 
and the deployment of Lebanese troops to the Israeli border.200         
 As with “Operation Accountability” and “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” Israel 
resorted to a deterrence-by-punishment strategy to achieve the political and military 
objectives mentioned above.  Airpower was used almost exclusively, with stand-off 
weapons used to target not only Hezbollah targets, but also targets that would cause 
considerable pain to the civilian population in order to turn off support for the group.  
Ground forces played a minimal role in the hostilities because Israel still had an aversion 
to casualties after its 18-year occupation of Lebanon.201  Dangerous strategies that risked 
extensive casualties were ruled out also because the government wanted to maintain 
economic stability.  This mindset ultimately limited options that the IDF could pursue to 
achieve Israel’s objectives.202  Consequently, the government waited until the last week 
of the war to mobilize enough reservists and threaten a credible ground invasion.203   
The deterrence-by-punishment strategy was accompanied by an extensive 
psychological warfare campaign.  During the conflict, the IDF activated its reserve 
psychological warfare unit to plan and execute a number of operations.204  The strategy 
was designed to demonize Hezbollah within Lebanon and the international community, 
gain support and cooperation from the Lebanese population, and intimidate and 
demoralize Hezbollah fighters.205  First, Israel set up websites during the conflict that 
appeared Lebanese in origin with messages such as, “Help Lebanon eradicate 
Hezbollah’s evil and get back its independence, freedom and prosperity.”206   
Second, anti-Hezbollah leaflets were dropped from Israeli aircraft almost on a 
daily basis to warn civilians of impending attacks, to request cooperation from Lebanese 
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citizens, and to tarnish Hezbollah’s reputation.  For example, thousands of leaflets were 
dropped over South Beirut on 13 July saying:   
To the inhabitants of Lebanon:  Due to the terrorist activities carried out 
by Hezbollah which destroys the effort to find a brighter future for 
Lebanon . . . The Israeli Army will continue its work within Lebanon for 
as long as it deems fit to protect the citizens of the State of Israel.  For 
your own safety and because we do not wish to cause any more civilian 
deaths, you are advised to avoid all places frequented by Hezbollah.  You 
should know that the continuation of terrorist activities against the State of 
Israel will be considered a double—edged sword for you and Lebanon.  
The State of Israel.207 
Several leaflets also were dropped over Lebanon depicting Hezbollah as a proxy 
for Syria and Iran.  For example, the leaflet shown in Figure 1 depicts Nasrallah as a 
puppet being controlled by two hands labeled as Syria and Iran.208  The text reads:     
To Lebanese citizens:  How long?  How long will you be marionettes in 
the hands of Syria and Iran?  How long will Hezbollah, the fifth column, 
continue to put your independence and safety in danger?  Hezbollah and 
its leader are hurting the peace and prosperity of Lebanon that was created 
after a great effort.  Israel will continue to use all of its power to strike 
Hezbollah and to bring peace back to the area.  The State of Israel.209






Figure 1.   Leaflets dropped by Israeli forces on 18 July.  (From:  Friedman) 
 
 
Third, Israel transmitted similar messages to mobile phones and across hijacked 
phone lines.210  For example, cell phone users received text messages appearing as news 
updates.  One text message read:  “Make your voice heard!  Do you feel Hezbollah are to 
blame for the current violence?”211  The message prompted recipients to reply if they 
agreed with the text.212   Lebanese civilians also received phone calls throughout the day, 
starting as early as 0530 in the morning, with recorded messages such as: 
Oh Lebanese people, we tell you not to follow Hezbollah.  We will 
continue to strike and no one will bring your prisoners back from Israel 
except the Lebanese government.  Hassan, have you realized yet that the 
Israeli army is not as delicate as a spider’s web?  It’s a web of steel that 
will strangle you!  This is the state of Israel.  This resistance . . . is forcing 
you to stay at home like rats.  Who is it that’s putting your life in danger?  
Who is using you as human shields?  We don’t want to harm you.  We’re 
                                                 




bombing the infrastructure so Hezbollah will have no means of firing its 
rockets.  We know you wanted to hit Israel, but you have confronted a 
house made of steel.  This is the Israel Defense Forces. 213 
   
Fourth, in order to influence the international community, Israel provided the 
foreign press with stories that favored the Jewish state, such as interviews with Israeli 
civilians who were victimized by Hezbollah’s bombardments.214  Fifth, in an attempt to 
intimidate the group, Israel hijacked Hezbollah’s television channel, al-Manar, and 
broadcasted derogatory images of Nasrallah, dead Hezbollah fighters, and bombed 
Hezbollah facilities.215  Israeli television also aired images of the IDF allegedly moving 
Hezbollah corpses in body bags.216  Finally, in an effort to diminish Hezbollah’s 
psychological warfare capabilities, Israel also deleted the content of most of the group’s 
websites and made unsuccessful attempts to destroy their television station, al-Manar.217   
2. Results 
There is considerable debate regarding whether Israel achieved its first political 
objective of reasserting deterrence against Hezbollah and other threats throughout the 
region.218  According to Cordesman, deterrence is based on perception and as the saying 
goes, “Perception is reality.”219  Therefore, Israel needed to create the perception among 
Arab states and their populations that the cost and risk of allowing non-state actors like 
Hezbollah to operate within their borders was too high.  Israel would achieve this by 
inflicting massive damage against Lebanon and its civilian population as retribution for 
not controlling Hezbollah.220  Although it inflicted considerable damage through 
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airpower, Israel also signaled weakness because of its sensitivity to casualties which 
made the government reluctant to commit ground forces.  According to author Efraim 
Inbar, this widespread perception throughout the Arab world actually invites aggression 
rather than act as a deterrent.221     
Additionally, Cordesman states that some Israeli experts outside the government 
believe that the damage inflicted by Israel against Lebanon’s civilian population also 
weakened deterrence.222  One estimate states that Israel’s air strikes resulted in more than 
1,200 civilians being killed, 130,000 homes destroyed, and more than $7 billion damage 
to the economy and infrastructure.223  Consequently, many think that this level of 
destruction and casualties—arguably disproportional to the capture of two soldiers—
actually increased hostility against Israel among the Lebanese and other Arab 
populations, thereby creating more support and volunteers for Hezbollah.224   
Israel also did not achieve its second political objective which was to change the 
political landscape in Lebanon so that the government finally would exercise control over 
Hezbollah.225  However, the war and subsequent events internal to Lebanon did succeed 
in splitting the country and political system in two.  One group consists of mostly Shi’a 
who suffered the brunt of Israel’s retaliation and view Hezbollah’s weapons as the only 
legitimate deterrence against future threats.  The other group consists of most Sunnis and 
some Christians who blame Hezbollah’s recklessness for Israel’s retaliation.226  In short, 
Israel was unable to convince the Shi’a, many of whom are dependent on Hezbollah for 
social services and protection, that the group was more a liability than an asset.  Until the 
Lebanese government can replace Hezbollah in providing these basic needs, the group’s 
popularity likely will continue unabated. 
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The first military objective of Israel, eliminate or degrade Hezbollah’s strategic 
missile and rocket threat, was not achieved.  Instead, Hezbollah was able to launch 
approximately 4,000 rockets into northern Israel during the hostilities, forcing thousands 
into bomb shelters and displacing half a million people.227  Hezbollah also was given the 
opportunity to improve its military capabilities through lessons learned and afterwards 
was able to re-supply its medium- and long-range rocket arsenal.228  According to 
Cordesman, Hezbollah’s success probably provided strong incentive for Iran and Syria to 
continue their covert support to the group.229 
 At first glance, it seemed that Israel would achieve its second and third military 
objective which was to create a Hezbollah-free security zone along the Lebanon-Israel 
border and obtain the release of the two captured soldiers.  UNSCR 1701 was drafted by 
the United States and France, and passed on August 12, 2006 to end the fighting between 
Israel and Hezbollah.  The language and details of the resolution were more favorable to 
Israel than to Lebanon and Hezbollah for several reasons.  First, it blamed Hezbollah for 
the outbreak of the war and ordered it to immediately cease all attacks.  Second, Israel 
was only ordered to stop offensive operations and allowed to stay in southern Lebanon 
until replaced by a sufficient number of troops from UNIFIL and the Lebanese army. 230    
Most importantly, the resolution called for the establishment of a security zone 
along the Israeli border free of Hezbollah military positions.  Finally, it also ordered the 
unconditional release of the captured Israeli soldiers, but not for three Lebanese soldiers 
that Israel was holding.231  However, although UNIFIL forces and the Lebanese army 
were deployed to southern Lebanon, Hezbollah maintained that it would remain armed 
and present not only in southern Lebanon, but also throughout the country.232  Also, 
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Israel was unable to obtain the unconditional release of the two captured soldiers.233  
Therefore, the resolution was unsuccessful in bringing Israel’s second and third military 
objective to fruition.      
 Beyond not achieving any of the political and military objectives, Israel also 
suffered a major psychological set-back.  According to Pahlavi, “the Jewish state 
forfeited the psychological upper hand on all fronts:  domestic, regional and 
international.”234  A public opinion poll conducted by newspaper Yediot Aharonot 
revealed that most Israelis believed that the army had not achieved any of the campaign’s 
objectives, UNSCR 1701 represented a moral defeat for Israel, and that the country had 
lost the war.235  Another opinion poll taken the day that UNSCR 1701 was passed 
showed that 58 percent of Israelis believed the country had failed to achieve few if any of 
its war objectives.236  The government and army were harshly criticized for its perceived 
arrogance, under-estimating Hezbollah’s resistance, over-estimating its own capabilities, 
establishing overly ambitious objectives, and not sufficiently preparing for the war.237    
 At the regional level, Israel lost the public and historic backing of Egypt, Jordan, 
and Saudi Arabia against Hezbollah during the war.  All three countries initially 
condemned Hezbollah’s aggression against Israel and blamed it for instigating the 
hostilities.  However, their criticisms stopped as Arab public opinion became enraged by 
growing Lebanese civilian casualties caused by Israel’s bombing campaign.238  For those 
countries that supported Hezbollah from the start of hostilities, such as Iran and Syria, 
Israel’s failure likely was interpreted as a victory for Hezbollah.  This perception can be 
explained by an insightful comment on modern counterinsurgency warfare made by 
former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during the aftermath of the Vietnam War, 
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“the conventional army loses if it does not win . . . the guerrilla wins if he does not 
lose.”239  Consequently, Pahlavi believes that Israel’s inability to win actually enhanced 
the prestige of Hezbollah and increased the credibility of its propaganda efforts among 
the Arab and Muslim population.240   
E. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter examines Israel’s military and political objectives in Lebanon from 
1990 until the end of the 34-day war in 2006, and how it was unable to achieve any of 
them with the strategies employed.  The findings from this Chapter are compared with 
Chapter IV in order to determine the extent to which Hezbollah’s psychological warfare 
strategy contributed to Israel’s failures in Lebanon.  Chapter V concludes that 
Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy was not the deciding factor in preventing 
Israel from achieving its objectives.     
 Israel’s primary objective throughout these three time periods was to deter 
Hezbollah from carrying out attacks in southern Lebanon and against northern Israel.  
During the 1990s, the group pursued deterrence-by-punishment through high-intensity 
conventional attacks in order to destroy Hezbollah’s ability to carry out violent acts and 
eliminate Lebanon’s support for the group.  This was an inappropriate prescription 
against an asymmetric threat, causing significant collateral damage, and ultimately 
angered the Lebanese civilian population.  Furthermore, Israel’s aversion to civilian 
casualties restricted the use of ground forces over time.  After an 18-year occupation, the 
government realized that its strategy was failing and ordered a unilateral withdrawal from 
in 2000 because of mounting public pressure.   
Thereafter, Israel attempted to deter Hezbollah through minimal force and 
diplomacy.  Mild responses, however, further deteriorated Israel’s deterrence which 
already was bruised from the 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon and then the 2005 
withdrawal from Gaza.  Israel signaled that it was either unwilling or unable to fight.  
Israel also failed to contain Hezbollah with diplomacy because Syria, Iran, and Lebanon 
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were either unwilling or unable to control the group.  Instead, these states helped or 
permitted Hezbollah to grow into a strategic threat.  The outbreak of the 34-day war 
marked the end of this strategy.      
During the 2006 conflict, Israel once again reverted back to deterrence-by-
punishment through the use of overwhelming conventional force—primarily airpower—
to eliminate Hezbollah’s ability to carry out attacks and turn off Lebanese support for the 
group.  The Jewish state, more than ever, was unwilling to commit large numbers of 
ground forces because of its sensitivity to casualties.  Not surprisingly, this strategy once 
again failed because it was inappropriate against an asymmetric threat embedded within 
the civilian population.  Extensive collateral damage angered the Lebanese civilian 
population and elicited harsh international criticism.  Eventually Israel was forced to quit 
because of domestic and international pressure.       
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IV. HEZBOLLAH’S PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to determine the extent to which Hezbollah’s psychological warfare 
strategy prevented Israel from achieving its military and political objectives in Lebanon 
from the 1990 to 2006, this Chapter examines Hezbollah’s overall response to the Jewish 
state.  The Chapter is broken down into three time periods:  1) 1990 to Israel’s unilateral 
withdrawal in 2000, 2) following Israel’s withdrawal up until the 34-day war in 2006, and 
3) during the 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah.  First, Hezbollah’s overall 
objectives and strategy within each time period are defined.  Second, the group’s 
psychological warfare strategy to include its target audiences, messages, channels of 
communication, and desired effects are outlined.   
 From 1990 to 2000, Hezbollah’s objective was to resist Israel’s occupation of 
southern Lebanon by demoralizing the enemy and pressuring it to withdraw and by 
winning the support of the Lebanese population.  This goal was pursued through a 
combined strategy of guerrilla and psychological warfare, political participation, and an 
extensive social service network.  Hezbollah succeeded in achieving its objective.  
Subsequent to Israel’s unilateral withdrawal in 2000, the group continued resistance 
against Israel’s occupation of the disputed Shebaa Farms area through guerrilla and 
psychological warfare.  It also pursued its ultimate objective—destroying the Jewish 
state—by providing advice, training, equipment, funding, and psychological warfare 
support to the Palestinians.241  Hezbollah was not able to destroy Israel, but it likely 
contributed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thereby distracting attention away from 
Lebanon.  Nonetheless, the group eventually miscalculated when it captured two Israeli 
soldiers in 2006, events which instigated the 34-day war.  During this conflict, 
Hezbollah’s objective was to survive Israel’s military attacks by waging guerrilla and 
psychological warfare.  The group succeeded in achieving this objective.    
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B. 1990 TO 2000 WITHDRAWAL 
This section discusses Hezbollah’s response to Israel’s occupation of southern 
Lebanon starting in the 1990s until the unilateral withdrawal in May 2000.  First, it 
discusses how Hezbollah’s overall strategy against Israel’s occupation was resistance 
waged by guerrilla and psychological warfare.  Second, it breaks down the group’s 
psychological warfare strategy based on target audiences, enemy and domestic.  In short, 
Hezbollah attempted to wear down its enemy and pressure it into quitting Lebanon.  It 
also attempted to win the support of all Lebanese citizens regardless of their religion or 
sect.    
1. Overall Objectives and Strategy 
Throughout the 1990s Hezbollah wholeheartedly pursued its first declared 
objective—resisting Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon.  The group employed two 
different strategies, one against the enemy and the other against the Lebanese population.  
Against the enemy, Hezbollah employed a strategy that combined guerrilla and 
psychological warfare.242  This two-fold approach was designed to demoralize the IDF 
and SLA, influence Israeli public opinion by exploiting their sensitivity to casualties, and 
ultimately influence Israeli decision makers to unilaterally withdraw from Lebanon.243   
Hezbollah also set out to increase Lebanese support for its resistance agenda 
through a tri-fold strategy consisting of psychological warfare, participating in Lebanon’s 
political system and creating and maintaining an extensive social service network.  
Hezbollah understood that it could not wage a long war against Israel without gaining the 
support of the local population.  The group also refrained from attacking northern Israel 
unless provoked by Israeli attacks against Lebanese civilians.244  This restraint helped 
Hezbollah establish itself as a legitimate resistance movement as opposed to a fanatical 
terrorist group among the Lebanese.   
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2. Psychological Warfare Strategy 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter II, psychological warfare as defined by Schleifer 
“consists of delivering messages by nonviolent methods, to target audiences, domestic 
and neutral as well as among the enemy, with the aim of furthering the war effort.”245  
The following sections go in further detail about the psychological warfare strategy used 
by Hezbollah during the 1990s against their enemy and domestic audience, to include 
messages and themes.  Although psychological warfare also is employed against neutral 
audiences, this section will refrain from addressing this audience in depth because 
international criticism appeared to be less of a factor during this time period.   
During the 1980s, the group delivered its messages through newspapers and 
magazines.  It was not until the late 1980s and 1990s that Hezbollah was able to reach the 
Lebanese population by radio, television and the internet.246  From 1991 until 2000, 
nearly 60 percent of al-Manar’s broadcasting consisted of news, religious, sports, and 
cultural programs.  The remaining 40 percent was coverage of combat in the southern 
security zone.247  In short, up until Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, the majority of 
Hezbollah’s propaganda efforts were dedicated to strengthening Lebanese support for the 
resistance while also pressuring Israeli viewers to demand from their government a 
unilateral withdrawal.248 
a. Enemy Audience 
Hezbollah’s enemy audience was broken down into three categories:  1) 
the SLA, 2) the IDF, and 3) the Israeli public.249  According to Schleifer, there were six 
general themes or messages directed toward the enemy audience.  First, Hezbollah 
communicated their determination and readiness to sacrifice everything in order to 
achieve their objective.  Second, they impressed upon the enemy that what was before 
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them would be a long struggle, ultimately in favor of Hezbollah.  Third, the group 
attempted to portray the IDFs efforts as futile in the face of Hezbollah’s counterstrategy.  
Fourth, Hezbollah frequently reiterated their goal, which was for Israel to withdraw from 
southern Lebanon.  Fifth, Hezbollah attempted to instill an overwhelming sense of guilt 
in the soldiers and Israeli public.250  
    The SLA specifically was targeted with an aggressive campaign of 
intimidation and infiltration.  The objective of the strategy was to foster distrust within 
the SLA; create distrust between the SLA and IDF; demoralize SLA soldiers, thereby 
encouraging desertions; and increase collection capabilities.  Hezbollah did this by 
routinely publishing the names of senior leadership within the SLA, which consisted 
mostly of Christians and Druze, in addition to targeting them for assassination.  
Hezbollah also maintained records on SLA enlisted soldiers, consisting mostly of Shi’a 
(almost 70 percent), threatening to punish them when caught.251  Press conferences often 
were held featuring deserters enticing SLA soldiers to abandon their posts in exchange 
for the good life.  As a reward, SLA soldiers were offered amnesty in addition to a 
financial bonus if they deserted or agreed to serve as informers.  Hezbollah also 
transmitted radio broadcasts reminding the SLA that Israel frequently abandoned its 
allies.  As Israel received mounting pressure to withdraw from Lebanon, SLA soldiers 
increasingly feared for their livelihood and safety.252   
  The IDF was targeted with a campaign of harassment and intimidation.  
The objective of this strategy was to undermine the self-confidence of Israeli soldiers 
serving in southern Lebanon.253  Hezbollah used guerilla tactics such as attacking 
military outposts in southern Lebanon in order to raise a flag, killing or wounding 
officers, capturing Israeli soldiers, or laying mines along Israel’s northern border.  
However, these attacks were not intended to conquer territory, but to send a 
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psychological message.254  During each operation, guerrilla units would deploy with a 
combat cameraman to record images of these attacks from the frontlines.  Video footage 
would then be taken back to al-Manar for editing; specific incidents in the operation were 
highlighted with music and narration.  Starting in 1991, these videos repeatedly were 
aired in Lebanon on al-Manar and al-Fajr, helping to shape the perception that Hezbollah 
was militarily superior compared to the IDF.  These videos sometimes even were 
distributed to foreign media such as Associated Press and Reuters, and made its way onto 
Israeli television.255  Hezbollah also used its primary radio station, al-Nur, to urge IDF 
soldiers to stop fighting.256  
  The Israeli public was broken down into three subgroups:  1) the Zionist 
Left, which favored Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon; 2) Israeli families with 
members serving in southern Lebanon, particularly the mothers; and 3) Israeli decision 
makers.257  The objective with this audience was to demoralize the Jewish state and cause 
division among the population over the occupation of Lebanon.258  This would be 
achieved by exploiting Israel’s sensitivity to casualties.  Starting in 1996, al-Manar began 
broadcasting in Hebrew after adding antennas that expanded the station’s range to include 
northern Israel and western Syria.  With this extended range, Hezbollah was able to 
directly address the Israeli public and warn them about the cost of remaining in Lebanon.  
They did this partly by disseminating images of dead Israeli soldiers directly into Jewish 
homes through al-Manar.  The station even went as far as airing videos for Israelis that 
understood English and Russian.259 
During the same year, Hezbollah began using the internet to make appeals 
to the parents of Israeli soldiers.  For example, the group posted an interview with four 
mothers of Israeli soldiers serving in southern Lebanon entitled, “I Don’t Want My Son 
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to Die in Lebanon.”260  According to Conway, many parents of Israeli soldiers serving in 
southern Lebanon also admitted to looking up Hezbollah websites for updates.261  Some 
of the information posted by Hezbollah included up-to-the-minute statistical data on its 
military successes, to include number of IDFs and collaborators killed and number of 
dead martyrs.262 
Hezbollah specifically targeted IDF reservists or regular officers for 
attacks because they correctly assessed that these casualties would have a harsher impact 
on Israeli public opinion.263  By the end of the 1990s, Israel stopped sending reservists to 
serve in the occupation zone partly because of these attacks.264  One of Hezbollah’s most 
notorious propaganda efforts against the Israeli public took place in 2000 when al-Manar 
aired “Who is Next?” clips that showed numerous photos of killed Israeli soldiers, 
followed by a blank silhouette with a large question mark.265  Station managers admitted 
that their intent with these broadcasts was to “get into every (Israeli’s) mind and affect 
Israeli public opinion.”266  Station managers also admitted that in order to do this, they 
needed to acquire a thorough understanding of Israeli society.  They did this partly by 
establishing a Hebrew Observation Department, staffed by Hebrew speakers, to monitor 
Jewish radio and television 24 hours a day.267     
b. Domestic Audience 
As mentioned earlier, Hezbollah attempted to gain the support of all 
Lebanese citizens by framing their resistance as a national rather than sectarian 
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struggle.268  According to Schleifer, there were six general messages Hezbollah directed 
against their domestic audience which were a “mixture of Islamic and revolutionary 
secular motifs, taken from the arsenal of Shi’a fundamentalism, on the one hand, and the 
annals of twentieth-century national liberation movements, on the other.”269  First, the 
group tried to dispel fears that they were a proxy for Iran and instead emphasize Israel as 
a common enemy.  This was done in order to unite not just the Shi’a, but also Christian, 
Sunni, and Druze population behind their resistance agenda. 270   
Second, Hezbollah frequently highlighted Jerusalem’s significance as the 
third most important city in Islam, and where Mohammad ascended to heaven.271  This 
probably was done in order to justify why all Muslims, not just Palestinians, should 
support the pursuit of liberating Israel from Jewish control.   
Third, resistance was portrayed as a just cause against infidel invaders, 
destined to bring about a better future worth suffering for.  This message attempted to 
exploit a prevalent Arab sense of inferiority and discrimination by the West.272   
Fourth, the group admitted that the struggle would be long, but again 
would result in victory.273  Hezbollah likely understood that in order to maintain support 
from its domestic audience, a realistic timeline would need to be given, but with the hope 
of eventual success.    
Fifth, Hezbollah used religious messages to demonize Israel in addition to 
inundating its domestic audience with images of death and destruction caused by the 
Jewish state.  Sixth, the group portrayed resistance as part of God’s will.274  Hezbollah 
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disseminated these messages not only through their media apparatus, but also through 
their social service network and through political participation.275   
The group first attempted to win the support of the Lebanese Shi’a 
population—traditionally marginalized—by addressing their security, social, and 
economic needs.276  For example, the group generously paid its fighters in order to 
prevent them from joining the SLA, and it rebuilt Shi’a homes destroyed during Israeli 
attacks.  Hezbollah also established and operated an extensive social service network 
consisting of mosques, and religious, education, and social welfare systems.277  
According to Frederic Wehrey, these humanitarian efforts inspired many Shi’a to endure 
Israel’s attacks with unwavering loyalty to Hezbollah.  He further states that “for the 
Shi’a population to have ceased their material and moral support for Hezbollah’s fighters 
. . . they would have literally bit the hand that fed them.”278  Hezbollah attempted to 
create this same sense of dependency with the Christian and Sunni population.  However, 
the group also attacked non-Shi’a that supported the IDF.279   
The group worked to instill in its Shi’a fighters a psychological advantage 
over the better equipped IDF and SLA by propagating the idea of martyrdom, defined as, 
“sanctified death in the service of a defensive jihad.”280  Nasrallah was quoted saying, 
“the fighter’s strength and superiority does not stem from the type of weapon he carries, 
inasmuch as it stems from his will . . . and his advance towards death.”281  The concept of 
martyrdom is appealing to some Shi’a for historical and cultural reasons; Imam Husayn, 
the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed is revered among the Shi’a as the ultimate 
martyr figure.  Hezbollah fighters killed during battle were honored through postcards, 
posters, videos, billboards, and even key chains sold in the suburbs of southern Beirut.  
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Families of these men also were provided with pensions, housing, and various other 
social services.282  According to Wehrey, the group paid out over $90 million during just 
four years to families of wounded or killed Hezbollah fighters.283  These efforts helped to 
boost the morale of Hezbollah fighters and ensure a steady stream of volunteers.284 
C. POST-2000 WITHDRAWAL UNTIL 34-DAY WAR 
This section discusses Hezbollah’s response to Israel following its unilateral 
withdrawal from Lebanon.  First, it discusses how Hezbollah continued its resistance 
against Israel by carrying out military operations in the contested Shebaa Farms areas and 
by supporting the Palestinians during the Second Intifada which started in September 
2000.  Second, it examines the group’s psychological warfare strategy waged against its 
enemy and domestic audience; the latter which now also consisted of Palestinians living 
in Gaza and the West Bank.  During this time period, the group was able to focus almost 
exclusively on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis by broadcasting not just in Lebanon, but 
throughout the region and rest of the world because of technological advances.  
Psychological warfare was used to promote the group, recruit new members, demonize 
Israel, and encourage violence among Palestinians against Israel.       
1. Overall Objectives and Strategy 
After Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah continued to 
pursue its resistance agenda by contesting the disputed Shebaa Farms area occupied by 
Israel and demanding the release of remaining Lebanese prisoners.  During this time, 
Hezbollah carried out mostly symbolic attacks such as cross-border raids and mortar 
attacks against Israel, primarily in the disputed Shebaa Farms area.285  However, many 
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outside the organization began to question whether the group needed to maintain its 
weapons after Israel official withdrew from Lebanon.286  Consequently, Hezbollah’s 
second objective during this time period was maintaining its armed status.  The group 
pursued this goal by continuing with political participation, operating its social service 
network within Lebanon, and an aggressive psychological warfare campaign directed 
primarily towards its domestic audience. 
   The group also began to pursue its ultimate objective—to destroy Israel and to 
liberate Palestine—by encouraging or sometimes even helping Palestinians carry out their 
military operations. 287  Support to the Palestinians came in the form of advice, training, 
equipping, and funding to groups such as Hamas, Al-Aqsa Brigade and Islamic Jihad.288  
For example, Sheikh Hassan Izz al-Din, the group’s director for media relations, admitted 
that they supported the Palestinian cause “politically, financially, ethically and morally.  
We provide the Palestinians with weapons, training, and whatever they need.  We are 
there to stand by their side.”289  Encouragement was done by extending “propaganda 
assistance” through Hezbollah’s media apparatus.290   
2. Psychological Warfare Strategy 
This section discusses Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy after Israel’s 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.  In May that same year, al-Manar launched 
its satellite which allowed the station to disseminate its message to the rest of the region 
and international community.291  The focal point of Hezbollah’s psychological warfare 
strategy became the Palestinian Intifada which erupted in September 2000.292  According 
to analysts, al-Manar’s new purpose was “less the demoralization of an Israeli audience 
                                                 
286 International Crisis Group, “Hizbollah and the Lebanese Crisis.”   
287 Blanford, Voice, 232-233. 
288 Harb and Leenders, 176. 
289 Jorisch, 34. 
290 Ibid., 37-40. 
291 Conway, “Terror,” 13. 
292 Jorisch, 28-29. 
 59
and more the assistance of the Palestinians in their struggle, along with raising the 
awareness in Lebanon of the need to support the Palestinians against the Israeli 
government.”293     
a. Enemy Audience 
As stated earlier, the Israeli public and military continued to represent 
Hezbollah’s enemy audience.  By 2000, Hezbollah’s radio station al-Nur was able to 
broadcast in Hebrew into Israel’s central cities.294  Also, al-Manar invested in hi-end 
antennas after the withdrawal allowing the station to broadcast into Israel.  The group 
continued to harass the Israeli public by broadcasting videos on al-Manar, with Hebrew 
subtitles, calling on them to leave Israel and return to Europe and the United States.295  
According to Schleifer, beyond these verbal messages, the intent of these broadcasts was 
to send a frightening message to the Israeli public that if Hezbollah could target their 
televisions, they also could target their homes with rockets and mortars.296  Al-Manar 
also began targeting Israeli soldiers serving in the Shebaa Farms area.297 However, 
according to Conway, Hezbollah exerted less effort during this time toward demoralizing 
the Israeli public and instead focused on helping the Palestinians with their own 
resistance.298   
b. Domestic Audience 
Even after Israel’s withdrawal, Hezbollah continued to embrace its 
resistance frame.299  Framing is defined as “conscious strategic efforts by groups of 
people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate 
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and motivate collective action.”300  However, Hezbollah expanded its domestic audience 
to include not just the Lebanese population, but also the Palestinians living in Gaza and 
the West Bank.  According to Jorisch, Hezbollah through al-Manar “sustained this culture 
of resistance by legitimizing and inciting suicide bombing and other forms of terrorism; 
by justifying continued Hezbollah attacks in places such as Shebaa Farms; by glorifying 
Hezbollah’s past military successes; by lionizing Hezbollah leaders; by canonizing 
Palestinian and other Arab ‘martyrs’; and by recruiting young people to its militant 
cause.”301     
Within the Lebanese population, Hezbollah attempted to strengthen its 
resistance agenda by promoting the organization.  According to Jorisch, this was done by 
justifying and glorifying the group’s military actions along the Israel-Lebanon border, 
Shebaa Farms in particular.302  For example, al-Manar broadcasted videos entitled, “It is 
My Right to Recover Shebaa” which included the following lyrics: 
It is my right to defend my land and kick out occupiers; it is my right to 
declare my freedom and raise a flag for the oppressed; it is my right to 
recover Shebaa and all the captured fighters . . . We would not leave you 
with the rapist, even if many years pass.303 
Hezbollah also attempted to discredit Israel in an effort to justify its 
actions.  For example, al-Manar incited anger against the Israeli state by repeatedly 
showing footage of young martyrs killed by Israeli military action and also by blaming 
Jews for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  Hezbollah based the latter claim on an 
unsubstantiated report by al-Manar that 4,000 Jews were absent from work at the World 
Trade Center on the day of the terrorist attacks.304  It also aired many videos comparing 
Israel to Nazi Germany by depicting the Star of David as a swastika. 305   
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The group also justified suicide bombings by citing Islamic tradition.  For 
example, al-Manar regularly broadcasted clips of clerics and fatwas that defended this 
tactic.  Nasrallah also persuaded clerics to issue fatwas that called on individuals to carry 
out suicide operations.306  The importance of promoting this culture of martyrdom is 
reflected in a comment made by Nasrallah in reference to the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, 
“the culture of martyrdom is the strongest weapon . . . here lies our strength.”307  
Furthermore, he believes that Israel withdrew from Lebanon because: 
those who love death [followers of Hezbollah] defeated those who fear 
death [Israelis] . . . Those who see death and martyrdom as a way to 
immortal life defeated those who see death as destruction and loss . . The 
weapon of loving martyrdom, sacrifices, and readiness for death is one 
that nobody can take away . . . Yes, we make life through death.308  
Hezbollah glorified its organization by having al-Manar broadcast clips 
honoring its leaders and fighters.  Most of the attention was given to Nasrallah by airing 
his speeches, showing him in a variety of complimentary poses, and even highlighting his 
name which means “God’s victory.”309  Hezbollah fighters were portrayed as larger than 
life figures by al-Manar.  For example, videos showed Hezbollah guerrillas waving their 
weapons in victory, attacking and capturing Israeli posts, firing weapons and throwing 
grenades, and attacking Israeli convoys with rockets.  In extreme contrast, Israeli soldiers 
were shown as defeated by Hezbollah, oftentimes on stretchers or with destroyed 
equipment.310  Similarly, videos were shown that “exposed” Israel’s fear of suicide 
bombers and its military defeat in Lebanon (i.e. their unilateral withdrawal from 
                                                 
306 Jorisch, 81. 
307 Hassan Nasrallah quoted by Jorisch, 80-81. 
308 Ibid., 81. 
309 Jorisch, 86. 
310 Ibid., 86. 
 62
Lebanon).311  In short, Hezbollah was portrayed as the protector of Lebanon and Israel as 
unwilling to invade again for fear of the group’s military might.312  
In addition to justifying and glorifying the group’s military activities, 
Hezbollah also attempted to continue recruiting potential members through al-Manar.  
They did this conveying the message that “every resistance fighter ends up a winner, 
whether he lives or dies.”313  For example, al-Manar broadcasted two shows honoring 
former guerrillas, In Spite of the Wounds and My Blood and the Rifle.  The first show was 
designed to air biographies of former guerrillas that were wounded in the line of battle.  
The emphasis was on how Hezbollah took care of the fighters afterwards by providing 
them with medical care and financial assistance to continue with a life of resistance.  The 
second show was similar, but it highlighted the biographies of deceased fighters and had 
family and friends explain the virtues of martyrdom.  Even al-Manar officials admitted 
that these shows were intended to promote recruitment among the domestic audience and 
encourage a culture of resistance.314     
Recruitment also was done by teaching that resistance was a family affair; 
therefore al-Manar openly encouraged parents to teach their children this way of life, 
including suicide bombing.  Hezbollah even disseminated a videogame, Special Forces, 
which encouraged children to join the resistance and fight against the Jewish state.315  
According to Jorisch: 
Relatives of potential martyrs were urged to support those engaging in 
resistance and to embrace the prospect of sacrificing their loved ones for  
the sake of a greater goal.  Such programming was meant to convince 
ordinary members of Arab society to subscribe to the culture of 
resistance.316   
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As mentioned earlier, Palestinians living in the Gaza and West Bank 
became part of Hezbollah’s domestic audience.  Al-Manar, al-Nur radio, al-Intiqad 
newspaper, and several websites started to offer their services to the Palestinian cause.  
Hezbollah’s objective, particularly through al-Manar, was to “justify, foster, and 
perpetuate violence” among this target audience against Hezbollah’s enemies—Israel and 
the United States.317  The desired effect of the group’s psychological campaign was to 
“incite Palestinians to violence, encouraging them to refuse negotiations for a 
comprehensive settlement with Israel and to work toward the obliteration of the Jewish 
state.”318    
  During this time, al-Manar expanded its programming to focus on the 
Intifada at the expense of covering events inside Lebanon.  Immediately following 
Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, al-Manar broadcasted only 4 hours per day.  
Just a few months later after the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the station began 
broadcasting almost 18 hours per day.319  Examples of programming included interviews 
with leaders of Palestinian rejectionist and terrorist groups, regular news flashes on 
Israeli military and Palestinian operations, and music videos combining clips of 
Hezbollah attacks against Israeli military installations and battles between Palestinians 
and the IDF.  The intent with the music videos was to send a message that both 
struggles—Hezbollah versus Israel and Palestinians versus the Jewish state—were one in 
the same.  The deeper message was that what worked for Hezbollah in liberating southern 
Lebanon could also work for the Palestinians in liberating 1948 Palestine.320   
D. 34-DAY WAR 
This section discusses Hezbollah response to Israel during the 34-day war in 
2006.  First, it briefly discusses how the group waged guerilla warfare to survive Israel’s 
attacks.  Second, it examines the group’s psychological warfare strategy against three 
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target audiences:  1) the enemy which once again consisted of the Israeli public, 2) the 
domestic audience which consisted of the Lebanese population, and 3) the neutral 
audience which this time proved to be a key factor during the conflict.  In short, 
Hezbollah exploited Israel’s aversion to civilian casualties in order to pressure the Jewish 
state into a ceasefire agreement.  The group also emphasized collateral damage caused by 
Israel’s attacks in order to demonize the Jewish state to the domestic and neutral target 
audience while portraying itself as the protector of the Lebanese. 
1. Overall Objectives and Strategy 
Hezbollah’s immediate objective during the 34-Day war was merely to survive 
Israel’s military attacks.321  The group pursued survival by employing a guerrilla warfare 
strategy of concealment that involved hiding its fighters and weapons within the civilian 
population.322  For example, the group hid weapons caches and leaders inside mosques 
and child-care centers.323  They also rushed into schools and private homes to launch 
rockets and then quickly rushed out.324   This strategy made it difficult for Israel to strike 
targets from the air without causing significant collateral damage.325   
Hezbollah’s ultimate objective was to gain a symbolic victory in the eyes of its 
domestic, neutral, and even enemy audience through psychological warfare.326  The 
group realized that it could not defeat the Jewish state militarily; therefore, the primary 
weapons used by the group included al-Manar television, al-Nur radio, and several 
websites.327  Hezbollah used its media to exploit collateral damage in order to portray 
Israel’s attacks as egregious and inhumane.328  It also launched around 4,000 rockets into 
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Israel against civilian targets in order to exploit the government’s sensitivity to 
casualties.329  Hezbollah understood that sustained rocket attacks against Israeli civilian 
targets would pressure the Jewish state into a ceasefire.330   
2. Psychological Warfare Strategy 
Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy was the opposite of Israel’s in that it 
emphasized promoting its own image with its domestic and neutral audience, rather than 
merely arousing fear through the threat of military force against its enemy audience.331  It 
also worked to discredit Israel by exploiting collateral damage through its media 
apparatus.  During the war, al-Manar played a key role in Hezbollah’s psychological 
warfare strategy.  For example, it was the first to announce the capture of Israeli soldiers 
by Hezbollah, the event which instigated the conflict.  It also was the first to broadcast 
Nasrallah’s victory speech at the close of the war.332  In response to Israel’s cyber 
attacks, Hezbollah used hijacked websites to post recruitment videos, air al-Manar online, 
and solicit donations from supporters.333   
a. Enemy Audience 
Once again, Hezbollah’s enemy audience was the Israeli public.  The 
group sought to send a message that further military action by Israel would result in 
retaliation by Hezbollah against civilian targets.  The group used al-Manar in addition to 
several websites to intimidate the Israeli public by posting photographs showing the death 
and destruction caused by Hezbollah’s rocket attacks against Israeli towns.334  During the 
conflict, Nasrallah was at the heart of Hezbollah’s propaganda efforts.  He participated in 
numerous television interviews and made several online statements and threats promising 
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to strike Tel Aviv if Israel did not cease its air strikes against Beirut.  The goal was to 
pressure the Israeli government into a ceasefire agreement by exploiting its sensitivity to 
civilian casualties.335   
b. Domestic Audience 
Hezbollah’s domestic audience consisted of all Lebanese citizens.  As 
mentioned above, the group went through great lengths to send the message that it was 
the protector and benefactor of the Lebanese population.336  For example, Nasrallah 
declared to the media that “anyone who has lost their home will receive free furnished 
housing from Hezbollah for one year, starting today.”337  The group also attempted to 
send the message that Israel was responsible for the death and destruction, not Hezbollah.  
For example, Nasrallah reversed the blame during every one of his speeches, “portraying 
Hezbollah as the defender of Lebanon against Israeli aggression.”338  The group also 
emphasized the collateral damage caused by Israel’s airstrikes through its media 
apparatus.  For example, Hezbollah’s websites showcased gruesome photographs of 
death and destruction caused by Israel against the Lebanese population, such as images of 
torn bodies, destroyed homes, and corpses of innocent children.339  Also, during speeches 
televised on al-Manar and foreign press, Nasrallah emphasized Israel’s killing of innocent 
Lebanese children during its strikes.340     
c. Neutral Audience 
The neutral audience, consisting of the international community, proved to 
be an important factor during the 34-Day War.  As with its domestic audience, Hezbollah 
attempted to send the message that it was the protector of Lebanon and that Israel was 
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guilty of egregious atrocities against the Lebanese population.  By exalting itself and 
demonizing Israel, Hezbollah hoped to create an international backlash against Israel, 
pressuring them into a ceasefire agreement.  The group used all of its media capabilities 
for this effort, al-Manar and its numerous websites in particular.   
Of note, Hezbollah proved itself adept at controlling the flow of 
information from inside Lebanon to the rest of the world.  For example, the group 
escorted photographers to conflict areas, which often appeared staged with noisy 
ambulances leaving the scene.  They also censored and discouraged most reporters from 
recording and broadcasting the launching of Katyusha rockets.  These accusations were 
made by BBC, CNN, and even Al-Arabyia.  Further, the reporters were prohibited from 
filming Hezbollah bunkers or human shields.341  There are accusations that Hezbollah 
even falsified Reuters’ clips and provided inaccurate counts of victims from the bombing 
incidents in Tyre and Cana.342  The group also was less aggressive when appealing to 
non-Arab audiences.  For example, the English, German, and French websites were less 
militant than the Arabic versions which oftentimes referred to Israelis as Nazis.343   
According to Sarah Kreps, Israel later acknowledged that international 
support eventually eroded after images of IDF attacks and civilian casualties in Beirut 
began to be broadcasted throughout the media.344  For example, international criticism 
peaked during attacks against Qana that resulted in significant collateral damage—mostly 
because Hezbollah was fighting within a heavily populated area.  International reactions 
to these attacks even caused Israel to halt further airstrikes for 48 hours.  Even the United 
States reacted in horror to the images of destruction in Qana resulting from Israel’s 
attacks.  According to Kreps, these images severely constrained Israel’s strategic options 
by shortening the timeline it had to meet its war objectives.345   
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E. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter examines Hezbollah’s overall objectives and strategy against Israel 
from 1990 until the completion of the 34-day war in 2006.  Particular attention is given to 
the group’s psychological warfare strategy.  The findings from this Chapter are compared 
with Chapter III in order to determine the extent to which Hezbollah’s psychological 
warfare strategy thwarted Israel’s objectives and strategies in Lebanon.  Chapter V 
provides the results from this comparison which is:  Hezbollah’s psychological warfare 
strategy was not the deciding factor in preventing Israel from achieving its objectives.        
From 1990 to 2000, Hezbollah’s objective was to resist Israel’s occupation of 
southern Lebanon.  The group sought to demoralize the enemy through guerilla and 
psychological warfare in order to pressure Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon.  It 
also attempted to strengthen domestic support for its resistance agenda through political 
participation, an extensive social service network, and psychological warfare.  Hezbollah 
succeeded in achieving its objective through this comprehensive strategy—Israel 
unilaterally withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000 because the government eventually 
lost its will to fight.   
Subsequent to Israel’s withdrawal, the group continued resistance against Israel’s 
occupation of the disputed Shebaa Farms area through guerrilla and psychological 
warfare.  It also pursued its ultimate objective—destroying the Jewish state—by 
providing advice, training, equipment, funding, and psychological warfare support to the 
Palestinians.346  Hezbollah was not able to destroy Israel, but it likely contributed to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict thereby distracting attention away from Lebanon.  
Nonetheless, the group eventually miscalculated when it captured two Israeli soldiers in 
2006, events which instigated the 34-day war.   
During the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah’s objective was to survive Israel’s military 
attacks by waging guerrilla and psychological warfare.  First, the group sought to exploit 
Israel’s aversion to civilian casualties in order to pressure the government into a 
ceasefire.  Hezbollah did this by launching thousands of rockets into Israel.  Second, the 
group ensured that Israel’s military attacks inevitably would result in significant 
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collateral damage by employing guerrilla warfare tactics.  The deaths and destruction 
subsequently was emphasized by Hezbollah’s media in order to demonize the Jewish 
state to the domestic and neutral target audience, while portraying the group as the 
protector of the Lebanese.  Negative “press coverage” shortened the timeline in which 
Israel could pursue its objectives, thus allowing Hezbollah to survive.      
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This thesis argues that although Hezbollah waged an ambitious and effective 
psychological warfare campaign against Israel between 1990 and 2006, it was not the 
deciding factor for why the Jewish state failed in Lebanon.  Other major factors 
contributing to Israel’s failure include:  the Jewish state incorrectly assessed its enemy 
which resulted in the development of overly ambitious objectives and inappropriate 
strategies; its severe aversion to casualties inhibited military options; and Hezbollah’s 
guerrilla warfare strategy ensured that Israel’s attacks would result in severe collateral 
damage and succeeded in terrorizing the Jewish civilian population.  The group’s 
psychological warfare strategy played a pivotal role in exploiting Israel’s sensitivity to 
casualties, emphasizing Israel’s mistakes, and exaggerating the group’s own 
accomplishments.              
B. 1990 TO 2000 WITHDRAWAL 
Between 1990 and 2000, Israel’s objective was to deter Hezbollah from carrying 
out attacks within southern Lebanon and into northern Israel.  During this time period, 
however, Israel made numerous mistakes which were quickly exploited by Hezbollah’s 
guerrilla and psychological warfare strategy.  First, rather than seek to win the “hearts 
and minds” of the Lebanese population, Israel attempted to turn them against Hezbollah 
through an indirect-deterrence-by-punishment strategy consisting of mass bombardments 
against civilian targets.347  This strategy did not work because it violated all three 
principles of successful counterinsurgency operations related to the proper use of 
force.348  Consequently, rather than gain cooperation from the Lebanese population, this 
strategy only succeeded in alienating Israel from the victims and observers. 
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Israel’s second mistake was attempting to eliminate an asymmetric threat through 
overwhelming conventional forces of artillery and airstrikes.349  Much of this strategy 
was dictated by the Jewish state’s sensitivity to casualties which restricted the use of 
ground forces.350  This strategy, however, was ineffective against Hezbollah’s guerrilla 
and psychological warfare strategy which significantly improved during this time period.  
In response to guerrilla style attacks from Hezbollah, Israel would respond with high-
intensity attacks that usually resulted in significant collateral damage among the civilian 
population.  Hezbollah then would exploit this damage through its media outlets in order 
to justify resistance against Israeli aggression.351   
In addition to Israel’s failures, Hezbollah had many successes.  First, it was able 
to render the SLA useless through a campaign of intimidation and assassinations.  The 
group maintained records of all SLA members and threatened them with death unless 
they deserted or served as informants.  This resulted in considerable desertions and 
defections; the latter increased Hezbollah’s collection capabilities against the IDF.352  
Not surprisingly, this caused severe distrust between the IDF and SLA.353  These 
accomplishments were significant because part of Israel’s strategy during the occupation 
was to rely on the SLA to maintain a buffer zone between northern Israel and anti-Israel 
forces in southern Lebanon.354  
Second, the group also was able to win support from the Lebanese population for 
its resistance agenda, which is critical for an insurgency to succeed.  This partly was done 
through political participation starting in 1992 and by becoming the sole provider of 
reconstruction and social services in southern Lebanon.355  In addition to these methods, 
Hezbollah used psychological warfare to strengthen Lebanese support for the resistance 
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by framing it as a national rather than sectarian struggle.356  Part of this strategy involved 
broadcasting messages that demonized Israel, portrayed the IDF as weak, and exalted 
Hezbollah by exaggerating its military accomplishments.         
Third, Hezbollah was successful in intimidating and demoralizing the IDF and 
Israeli public through its guerrilla and psychological warfare tactics.  By 1997, the 
Hezbollah to IDF deaths ratio dropped from 5:1 to about 2:1, according to UN sources.357  
Videos of dead IDF soldiers or attacks against IDF outposts repeatedly were broadcasted 
on television and the internet in order to strengthen the perception that Israel was losing 
its war against Hezbollah.  The group also repeatedly launched rockets into northern 
Israel, which undermined the Jewish state’s justification for maintaining a southern 
security zone which was to protect northern Israel from guerrilla attacks.358  Eventually, 
it became apparent that Israel’s military strategy would not deter Hezbollah.359    
C. POST-2000 WITHDRAWAL TO 34-DAY WAR 
After the 2000 unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Israel’s objectives 
were to deter and contain Hezbollah through the use of minimal force and diplomacy.360  
According to Waxman, the Jewish state committed a series of fatal errors that actually 
emboldened rather than deterred Hezbollah.361  First, Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from 
Lebanon in 2000 was credited as a strategic loss for Israel and a victory for Hezbollah.  
Next, Israel’s deterrence steadily deteriorated as it consistently responded to Hezbollah’s 
attacks over the next six years with only mild responses.  Finally, the August 2005, 
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza further bruised Israel’s deterrence and boosted the 
credibility of armed resistance.  Consequently, both withdrawals and consistent military 
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restraint demonstrated to Israel’s adversaries that they were unwilling or unable to 
fight.362  Israel’s actions effectively achieved the opposite of deterrence.   
According to author Shmuel Bar, Israel’s deterrence strategy failed because the 
government never clearly defined its red lines.  Instead, Hezbollah construed what was 
appropriate based on previous clashes with Israel which did not elicit a harsh response.363  
Although the group expected a reaction from Israel, it did not anticipate a large-scale 
military retaliation because Israel consistently responded to past attacks with restrained 
military force.364  In fact, all skirmishes that occurred before and after the Israeli 
withdrawal—including the incident which sparked the 34-day war—fell within these 
parameters, demonstrating that Hezbollah did not disregard these perceived rules.365  
This argument is further supported by the fact that Nasrallah admitted following the 34-
day war during an interview that he was surprised by Israel’s response.366 
Diplomacy did little to contain Hezbollah as the group actually was allowed to 
significantly expand as a military threat, through the acquiescence of Lebanon and with 
active support from Iran and Syria.  The lack of a strong central government and military 
within Lebanon meant that there was nothing or no one to stand in the way of 
Hezbollah’s growth.  Israel could not deter Hezbollah through Iran because of a lack of 
diplomatic ties, concern over Iran’s missiles and nuclear program, and fear of retaliation 
by Iran through terrorist attacks abroad.  Lastly, Israel was unable to successfully deter 
Hezbollah through Damascus because Syria’s influence over the group diminished after 
the election of president Bashar al-Asad, and their withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005.367  
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Instead, it seems that Israel at best, monitored the group’s entrenchment within southern 
Lebanon and overall growth rather than take successful action to actually contain them.    
While Israel attempted to avoid confrontation with Hezbollah, the group was 
successful in continuing its resistance against the Jewish state by carrying out guerrilla 
attacks primarily in the disputed Shebaa Farms area.368  More importantly, the group 
continued to rally domestic support for its resistance agenda through political 
participation, operating its social service network, and psychological warfare.  Al-Manar 
played a central role in the latter method to justify the group’s actions, promote the 
organization and its leaders, discredit Israel, and recruit potential members.369  In short, 
the television station was successful in helping Hezbollah sustain a culture of resistance 
throughout Lebanon despite Israel’s official withdrawal in 2000.370 
The group also was able to expand its resistance against Israel by actively 
supporting the Palestinians during the Second Intifada which started in September 
2000.371  Support came in the form of advice, training, equipping, and funding to various 
Palestinian militant groups.372  Also, Hezbollah focused its psychological warfare efforts 
to encourage Palestinian aggression against Israel and raise awareness in Lebanon of the 
need to support the Palestinians in their struggle.373  It is unclear to what extent 
Hezbollah’s actions contributed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israel’s 2005 
withdrawal from Gaza.  However, it is obvious that while Israel was distracted by this 
crisis, the group as mentioned above was able to grow in strength and capabilities 
through the acquiescence of Lebanon and active support from Iran and Syria.374       
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D. 34-DAY WAR 
Several factors played into why Israel was unable to achieve its political and 
military objectives during the 34-day war.  First, the Jewish state’s objectives were overly 
ambitious.  These objectives included reestablishing deterrence, eliminating Hezbollah’s 
“state within a state” status, eliminating the threat posed by the group’s rocket arsenal, 
creating a security zone along the southern Lebanese border, and obtaining the release of 
two captured Israeli soldiers.375  To put it into perspective, Israel was attempting to 
quickly accomplish through this campaign what it had been unable to achieve during its 
18-year occupation of southern Lebanon.376  
As with “Operation Accountability” and “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” Israel was 
hoping to pressure the Lebanese government into controlling Hezbollah by making the 
civilian population suffer for the group’s actions.377  The Jewish state, however, 
underestimated the loyal following that Hezbollah cultivated within Lebanon over the 
previous decades.  As mentioned above, the group was aggressive in providing social 
services, protection, and political representation to not only the Shi’a, but also to Sunnis 
and Christians.  The group also consistently employed psychological warfare since the 
1990s in order to promote the group, justify resistance, demonize Israel, and recruit new 
members.378     
Second, Israel’s strategy was inappropriate.  Deterrence-by-punishment primarily 
through airpower was not optimal for the asymmetric threat that Hezbollah 
represented.379  For example, the group does not have many high-value targets such as 
bases and complex command and control nodes.  Also, the targets that they normally do 
have, such as weapons caches, leader hideouts, and launch sites, are intentionally 
embedded within the civilian population making them difficult to attack without  
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causing significant collateral damage.380  Hezbollah recognized this, as evidenced by a 
public statement made by Nasrallah in May 2006:   
Hezbollah fighters live in their houses, in their schools, in their churches, 
in their fields, in their farms and in their factories.  You can’t destroy them 
in the same way you would destroy an army.381   
Consequently, Hezbollah’s guerilla warfare strategy partly explains why Israel 
was unable to destroy the group’s rocket and missile arsenal.  It also made collateral 
damage inevitable, contributing to the perception that Israel’s attacks were egregious and 
disproportional when broadcasted by the media.382   
Nonetheless, Israel also miscalculated when it intentionally bombed civilian 
infrastructure as a part of their deterrence-by-punishment strategy.383  This approach 
violated all three principles of successful counterinsurgency operations and was easily 
exploited by Hezbollah’s media.384  Consequently, Israel was unable to win support from 
the Lebanese civilian population and international community.  For example, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan ceased initial criticism against Hezbollah after their populations 
witnessed through the media the death and destruction caused by Israel’s attacks and 
began protesting them instead.385  This about-face is significant because no Arab state 
has ever publicly condemned an attack against Israel.386   
The Jewish state may not have considered how its actions would be perceived by 
Hezbollah, Lebanon, and the international community.  According to Cordesman, Israel 
historically has been more concerned with internal politics and perceptions rather than the 
perceptions of the outside world when it comes to executing war.387  This would explain 
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why Israel’s strategy was limited to methods that would minimize IDF casualties and 
preserve economic stability.  It also partly explains why they miscalculated the effect that 
their deterrence-by-punishment and psychological warfare strategy would have on 
Hezbollah, the Lebanese and neighboring Arab states, and the rest of the world.   
Third and alluded above, Israel was unwilling to do militarily what was necessary 
to achieve its objectives out of fear that it would incur casualties and disrupt economic 
development in Israel.388  Hezbollah recognized and exploited this fear through guerrilla 
and psychological warfare tactics.  For example, the group launched approximately 4,000 
rockets into Israel displacing at least half a million Jewish civilians.389  Also, it 
repeatedly disseminated messages to Israel through its various media outlets that further 
military actions would instigate retaliation by Hezbollah against civilian targets.390  The 
goal was to pressure the Israeli government into a ceasefire.391 
Finally, although UNSCR 1701 called for the rapid deployment of UNIFIL forces 
and the Lebanese army to southern Lebanon, both were incapable of evicting or 
disarming Hezbollah.  The Lebanese government already had made it clear that it would 
not forcibly disarm Hezbollah because the army, about 35 percent Shi’a, could not be 
counted on to confront a group with whom they have various ties—religious, local or 
family.392  Also, according to Waxman, UNIFIL forces likely would not have risked 
instigating a confrontation with Hezbollah by trying to disarm it.393    
E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis concludes that Israel failed to achieve its military and political 
objectives in Lebanon for several reasons. Hezbollah’s successful psychological warfare 
strategy was one of them.  First, Israel failed to assess correctly the enemy which resulted 
                                                 
388 Kreps, 76 
389 Waxman, 31. 
390 Conway, “Cybercortical,” 15. 
391 Fayutkin, 214. 
392 Waxman, 34. 
393 Ibid., 34. 
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in overly ambitious objectives and inappropriate military strategies.  For example, Israel 
underestimated the support that Hezbollah had carefully cultivated among the Lebanese 
population through years of political participation and by providing protection and 
critical economic and social services to those in need.  Consequently, Israel miscalculated 
and repeatedly attempted to use an indirect-deterrence-by-punishment strategy against an 
asymmetric threat that enjoyed tremendous popular support. 
Second, Israel’s military options were severely constrained because of its aversion 
to casualties.  Any military response to an asymmetric threat requires the use of forces on 
the ground.  However, the Jewish state over time began to use fewer ground forces and 
relied more on airpower in response to the Israeli public’s sensitivity to IDF casualties.   
Third, Hezbollah waged effective guerilla warfare thereby making itself a difficult 
target for Israel to destroy through conventional military methods.  Because the group 
intentionally embedded its fighters and weapons within the civilian population, any 
attempt by Israel to target Hezbollah resulted in significant collateral damage.  The group 
also was easily able to terrorize the Jewish public by launching rockets into Israel.  
Damage in both Lebanon and Israel was easily exaggerated by media coverage.   
Fourth, Hezbollah also waged an effective psychological warfare campaign that 
sought to demonize Israel, degrade the enemy’s will to continue fighting by exploiting  
the Israeli public’s sensitivity to casualties, and win support of the domestic and neutral 
audience.  Israel’s inappropriate military strategies made it easier for Hezbollah to 
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